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INTRODUCTION

In 2007, Rafael Correa, then-President of Ecuador, offered
not to extract the oil located underneath Ecuador’s Yasuní
National Park, in exchange for the international community
paying Ecuador $3.6 billion, which was one-half of the estimated
value of those oil fields.1 He stated that he thought his offer was

© 2022 Claire Wright
* Associate Professor, St. Thomas University College of Law, Miami
Gardens, Florida.
1. See, e.g., Lisa Friedman, Ecuador Asks World To Pay To Keep Yasuni
Oil Underground, SCI. AM. (May 1, 2012), https://www.scientificamerican.com
/article/ecuador-asks-world-to-pay-to-keep-yasuni-oil-underground/;
David
Kestenbaum, Ecuador to World: Pay up To Save the Rainforest. World to
Ecuador: Meh., NPR (Sept. 2, 2013, 3:21 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections
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“an elegant way to help tackle climate change.”2 He was
referring to the fact that destroying part of the Yasuní National
Park would release 800 million tons of carbon dioxide into the
atmosphere while also abolishing a valuable “carbon sink” that
otherwise would have absorbed millions of tons of carbon
dioxide.3 A carbon sink is a plot of land or body of water that
absorbs more carbon that it emits.4 In addition, extracting the
oil from underneath the Yasuní and then burning those barrels
of oil would release another 410 million tons of carbon dioxide
into the atmosphere, according to Ecuador’s sources.5 Moreover,
development of the Yasuní would threaten the viability of
numerous plant and animal species, as Yasuní National Park is
one of the most biologically diverse ecosystems on earth.6

/money/2013/09/02/216878935/ecuador-to-world-pay-up-to-save-the-rainforestworld-to-ecuador-meh.
2. Brad Plumer, Ecuador Asked the World To Pay It Not To Drill for Oil.
The World Said No., WASH. POST, (Aug. 16, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/08/16/ecuador-asked-the-world-to-pay-it-not-to-drillfor-oil-the-world-said-no/; Ryan Haddad, An Un-Conventional Approach:
Ecuador’s Yasuní-ITT Initiative Is in Discord with the UNFCCC, 12
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 15 (2012) (citing Press Release, Min. of Foreign
Affairs, Republic of Ecuador, Ecuador Takes Leadership Role on Climate
Change (Sept. 24, 2007), http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=
104&STORY=/www/story/09-24-2007/0004668939&EDATE=), https://digitalco
mmons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1509&context=sdlp.
3. See Haddad, supra note 2, at 15 (referencing the effects of the carbon
sink).
4. See, e.g., N.C. State Univ., Carbon Sink or Carbon Source? Aerosols
Play Significant Role in Shifts, SCI. DAILY (Dec. 9, 2004), https://www
.sciencedaily.com/releases/2004/12/041208225316.htm (“Researchers at North
Carolina State University have shown that the amount of aerosols – dust
particles, soot from automobile emissions and factories, and other airborne
particles – in the atmosphere has a significant impact on whether the surface
area below either absorbs or emits more carbon dioxide (CO2).”).
5. See Plumer, supra note 2; Juan Fernando Villa-Romero, Ecuador’s
Yasuni National Park in the Age of Synthetic Biology, LATIN AM. SCI. (Sept.
2013), http://latinamericanscience.org/2013/09/ecuadors-yasuni-national-parkin-the-age-of-synthetic-biology/ (placing the estimated amount of carbon dioxide
from barrels of oil burned at 400 million tons).
6. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 1 (“There is little doubt that the Yasuni
Reserve contains remarkable biodiversity . . . .”); Jeremy Hance, Photos: Park
in Ecuador Likely Contains World’s Highest Biodiversity, but Threatened by Oil,
MONGABAY (Jan. 19, 2010), https://news.mongabay.com/2010/01/photos-parkin-ecuador-likely-contains-worlds-highest-biodiversity-but-threatened-by-oil/
(“Yasuni is the most biologically diverse place on Earth.”); Kelly Hearn, Deep in
Ecuador’s Rainforest, A Plan to Forego an Oil Bonanza, YALE SCH. ENV’T.:
YALEENVIRONMENT360 (Sept. 13, 2010), https://e360.yale.edu/features/deep_in
_ecuadors_rainforest_a_plan_to_forego_an_oil_bonanza (“In addition to its
remarkable biodiversity, Yasuni sits atop a fortune of oil, making the park an
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Essentially, President Correa was offering a conservation
easement (an agreement not to develop) to the international
community in exchange for payment by the international
community of $3.6 billion. President Correa’s proposal was
indeed an elegant and responsible approach to reducing carbon
dioxide emissions, as then-Secretary General of the United
Nations, Ban Ki-moon, acknowledged in a 2011 press
conference.7 Secretary General Ki-moon stated that President
Correa’s proposal was an “innovative concept to combat global
warming [and] strikes at the root of the problem by preventing
the release of CO2 in the first place . . . .”8 After Ecuador received
funding commitments from the international community
totaling only $13 million, however, President Correa withdrew
this offer in August 2013,9 and various entities, including “Andes
Petroleum Ecuador, a consortium of two Chinese state-owned
firms” commenced extracting oil from the Yasuní National Park
in 2016.10
Correa’s “conservation easement” idea apparently had
gained some traction by the September 29, 2020 U.S.
Presidential debate. During the climate portion of that debate,
then-U.S. Presidential candidate Joe Biden denounced the
deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon in general and specifically
the thousands of major fires that generally had been started by
people clearing the Amazon for development and then had
emblem of a development crisis bearing down on the entire western headwaters
of the Amazon basin.”).
7. See Haddad, supra note 2, at 15 (quoting Press Release, Ban Ki-Moon,
Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s Remarks at Joint Press Encounter
With President Rafael Correa of Ecuador, UN.ORG (Feb. 14, 2011),
http://www.un.org/sg/offthecuff/?nid=1723).
8. Id.
9. Juan Falconi Puig, The World Failed Ecuador on Its Yasuní Initiative,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 19, 2013, 9:08 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/poverty-matters/2013/sep/19/world-failed-ecuador-yasuniinitiative; Jonathan Watts, Ecuador Approves Yasuni National Park Oil
Drilling in Amazon Rainforest, GUARDIAN (Aug. 16, 2013, 10:38 AM), https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/ecuador-approves-yasuni-amazonoil-drilling.
10. Jonathan Kaiman, Controversial Ecuador Oil Deal Lets China Stake an
$80-Million Claim to Pristine Amazon Rainforest, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2016,
9:37 AM), https://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-ecuador-chinaoil-20160129-story.html; see Yasuní: A Silent Investment, DIÁLOGO CHINO (Jan.
7, 2015), https://dialogochino.net/en/extractive-industries/1152-yasuni-a-silentinvestment/ (explaining how the drilling will be for over 846 million barrels of
oil); Jose Llangari, Ecuador Begins Drilling Oil in a Pristine Corner of the
Amazon, SCI. AM. (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article
/ecuador-begins-drilling-oil-in-a-pristine-corner-of-the-amazon/.
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burned out of control in the summers of 2019 and 2020.11 For
many years, the undeveloped Brazilian Amazon has served as a
large “carbon sink” that absorbs much of the carbon dioxide
emitted around the world.12 Accordingly, destruction of the
Brazilian Amazon rainforest is concerning to people all over the
world.13 In reference to those fires, Biden stated that, if elected,
he would be “gathering up and making sure we had the countries
of the world coming up with $20 billion to say ‘here’s $20 billion,
stop tearing down the forest and if you don’t, you are going to
have significant economic consequences.’”14
In response to Biden’s comments, Brazilian President
Bolsonaro, a right-wing proponent of economic development of

11. See Ryan Richards & Mikyla Reta, Charting a New Course for U.S.Brazil Action on the Amazon, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 13, 2021, 5:00 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2021/04/13/498006/cha
rting-new-course-u-s-brazil-action-amazon/ (“During the 2020 presidential
debate, then-candidate Biden affirmed the urgency of addressing the threat
that President Bolsonaro’s policies posed to the Amazon and to the global
climate, proposing to work with global partners to create a $20 billion fund that
would incentivize Bolsonaro to change his approach to the Amazon.”).
12. See Anna Jean Kaiser, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Is the Amazon Really ‘the
Lungs’ of Planet Earth? No, It’s More Like Our Sink, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 27, 2019,
12:13 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ct-nw-cb-amazon-fire
s-explainer-20190827-oneqsy6c6nfuxb33bictnewnbm-story.html (“[A] better
way to picture the Amazon’s role is as a sink, draining heat-trapping carbon
dioxide from the atmosphere.”); Frances Lopez, Is the Amazon Forest Really ‘the
Lungs of the Planet’?, EURONEWS, https://www.euronews.com/2019/09/02/is-theamazon-forest-really-the-the-lungs-of-the-planet (last updated Mar. 9, 2019).
13. See Ernesto Londoño & Letícia Casado, Under Pressure, Brazil’s
Bolsonaro Forced to Fight Deforestation, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/01/world/americas/Brazil-amazon-deforestat
ion-bolsonaro.html (describing how Bolsonaro’s environmental policies are
causing Brazil to become “an environmental pariah on the global stage,
destroying a positive reputation that took decades to build”); Robert Kessler,
The Amazon Is Burning, ECOHEALTH ALL. (Aug. 2019), https://www.ecohealth
alliance.org/2019/08/the-amazon-is-burning (“The Amazon rainforest is one of
the greatest natural treasures of our Earth. Its health, in many ways, is our
entire planet’s health.”).
14. Flora Charner & Ivana Kottasová, Brazil’s Bolsonaro Rejects Biden’s
Offer of $20 Billion to Protect the Amazon, CNN (Sept. 30, 2020, 3:31 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/30/americas/brazil-bolsonaro-biden-amazonintl/index.html; see also ‘Disastrous’: Brazil’s Bolsonaro Slams Biden Over
Amazon Comments, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/n
ews/2020/9/30/disastrous-brazils-bolsonaro-slams-biden-over-amazon-comme
nts [hereinafter AL JAZEERA, SEPT. 30, 2020] (including Bolsonaro’s response
that Brazil “would not accept ‘coward threats towards our territorial and
economic integrity’”).
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the Brazilian Amazon,15 angrily accused Biden of threatening
Brazil’s sovereignty and stated that Brazil actually had done
more than any other country to preserve its undeveloped lands.16
Bolsonaro’s claim that “Brazil is a model of conservation because
of the size of forest land still standing”17 is belied by the fact that,
since he took office in January 2019, destruction of the Brazilian
Amazon accelerated at an eleven-year high, with forest
clearances up 34.5% and an area the size of Lebanon destroyed.18
President Bolsonaro has been widely criticized for his prodevelopment stance on the Amazon in general and his handling
of the 2019 and 2020 Amazon fires in particular.19
Still, Bolsonaro’s response raised some legitimate questions
regarding Biden’s comments. The first part of Biden’s statement
was fine; he was merely touting Correa’s idea of a country
offering a conservation easement in exchange for compensation,
and numerous Brazilian leaders in recent years have argued
that “the world should pay up if it wants more forest to be
preserved.”20 However, Biden’s subsequent reference to
imposition of economic sanctions on Brazil should Brazil decline
to grant a conservation easement to the international
community was mysterious. A conservation easement is a
voluntary measure; how could Brazil’s declination of such an
easement proposal justify imposition of economic sanctions on
15. See AL JAZEERA, SEPT. 30, 2020, supra note 14 (explaining how
Bolsonaro “has insisted on economic development of the region”); Brazil to
Create ‘Amazon Council’ to Protect and Develop the Rainforest, REUTERS (Jan.
21, 2020, 10:38 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-environment/br
azil-to-create-amazon-council-to-protect-and-develop-the-rainforest-idUSKBN
1ZK237 (explaining how Bolsonaro “wants economic development in the
Amazon to improve the lives of its 30 million inhabitants, including its
indigenous tribes”); Ishaan Tharoor, How Brazil’s Bolsonaro Threatens the
Planet, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/20
18/10/19/how-brazils-bolsonaro-threatens-planet/ (explaining how Bolsonaro
“has long supported opening up indigenous areas, currently protected by the
government, to agricultural and commercial use”).
16. See AL JAZEERA SEPT. 30, 2020, supra note 14; Charner & Kottasová,
supra note 14 (“Bolsonaro told the UN General Assembly that no other country
protected as much wild territory as Brazil.”).
17. AL JAZEERA SEPT. 30, 2020, supra note 14.
18. Id.
19. See id. (“The Brazilian leader has insisted on economic development of
the region, drawing condemnation from environmentalists, climate scientists
and foreign leaders . . . .”); Charner & Kottasová, supra note 14 (explaining
that, in 2019, “the G7 group which includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States used its summit in France
to call on Bolsonaro to step up efforts to protect the Amazon.”).
20. AL JAZEERA SEPT. 30, 2020, supra note 14.

180

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 23:1

Brazil? Furthermore, is it fair for developed nations to focus on
developing countries’ destruction of carbon sinks, when there
would be no need for developing countries to preserve their
carbon sinks if the developed nations did not emit so many tons
of carbon dioxide in the first place?21 Following Biden’s
comments, Brazil’s Environment Minister, Ricardo Salles, was
more pragmatic. He tweeted: “Just one question: Biden’s $20bn
in aid, is that yearly?”22
The overwhelming majority of climate scientists around the
world maintain that climate change (used interchangeably in
this article with “global warming”) is caused by humans.23
Primarily, climate change is caused by the burning of fossil fuels,
which releases CO2 (a greenhouse gas), which is then trapped in
the earth’s atmosphere and raises the average annual

21. See, e.g., Dawn Stover, You Pay or We Drill, ANTHROPOCENE MAG.
(Dec. 2013), https://www.anthropocenemagazine.org/2013/12/how-do-we-notdrill (including former Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa’s argument that it
is hypocritical for other nations to expect Ecuador to leave its resources
untouched when “they are the polluters”). China is the largest emitter of carbon
dioxide. See Ian Tiseo, Largest Global Emitters of Carbon Dioxide by Country
2019, STATISTA (Sept. 24, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/271748/the
-largest-emitters-of-co2-in-the-world (stating that China has “a share of almost
30 percent of the world’s total CO2 emissions that year”). Therefore, it is
questionable whether China should be considered a developed nation today. See
Philippe Benoit & Kevin Tu, Is China Still a Developing Country? And Why It
Matters for Energy and Climate, COLUM. U.: CTR. ON GLOB. ENERGY POL’Y
(July 23, 2020), https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/research/report/chinastill-developing-country-and-why-it-matters-energy-and-climate
(“While
China’s economic might makes it a superpower alongside the United States, it
still faces many of the major challenges of a typical developing country, such as
widespread energy poverty, including 400 million people without access to clean
cooking, significant air pollution, and dependence on increasing energy use to
fuel future economic growth.”). However, the U.S. is the second largest emitter,
and many of the other large emitters of carbon dioxide are developed countries
as well. See Tiseo, supra. Moreover, “[a]lthough China currently emits the
highest levels of CO2 annually, it has emitted far less than the United States
over the past three centuries. Cumulative carbon dioxide emissions in the U.S.
reached 367 billion metric tons by 2018. Since the birth of the Industrial
Revolution more than 200 years ago, cumulative global CO2 emissions have
increased dramatically. However, emissions started to increase more rapidly as
of the 1960’s.” Id.
22. AL JAZEERA SEPT. 30, 2020, supra note 14.
23. Robert Lee Hotz & Timothy Puko, Some Climate Change Effects May
Be Irreversible, U.N. Panel Says, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2021, 6:00 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/some-climate-change-effects-may-be-irreversibleu-n-panel-report-says-11628496000; Causes of Climate Change, EUR. COMM’N,
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/climate-change_en (last visited Nov. 5, 2020)
[hereinafter Causes of Climate Change]. The full 3949-page IPCC Sixth
Assessment report can be accessed at https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/.
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temperature of the globe.24 At a minimum, this warming of the
globe is changing marine animals’ feeding locations, shrinking
polar ice caps, raising sea levels, and flooding low-lying lands.25
Moreover, many scientists have concluded that global warming
is also responsible for much longer and more severe droughts,
numerous and more dangerous wildfires, and many more
catastrophic hurricanes and other storms.26
Several climate scientists have warned that, if greenhouse
gas emissions are not significantly reduced by 2030, that date
may very well be a “tipping point,” meaning that selfperpetuating processes may then make reversal of a continually
warming world impossible.27 In fact, according to a report issued
by the United Nations-affiliated Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) on August 9, 2021, “[r]ising seas,
melting ice caps and other effects of a warming climate may
[already] be irreversible for centuries . . . .”28 The catastrophe
that we are facing may have been best summarized by Ko
Barrett, vice chair of the IPCC and the senior adviser for climate
at the Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research at the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. He stated
that “[w]e’ve known for decades that the world is warming, but
this report tells us that recent changes in the climate are
widespread, rapid and intensifying, unprecedented in thousands
of years.”29 In short, climate change is the most grave
environmental phenomenon threatening humanity today.

24. Causes of Climate Change, supra note 23.
25. See AR6 Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis, IPCC,
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/#SPM (last visited Oct. 26, 2021)
(“[A]ddresses the most up-to-date physical understanding of the climate system
and climate change . . . .”).
26. Hotz & Puko, supra note 23.
27. See Stephen Leahy, Climate Change Driving Entire Planet to
Dangerous “Tipping Point”, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.na
tionalgeographic.com/science/article/earth-tipping-point (“The idea of tipping
points was introduced 20 years ago by the [IPCC]. The loss of the West Antarctic
ice sheet and the Amazon rainforest, or extensive thawing of permafrost, as well
as other key components of the climate system, are considered ‘tipping points’
because they can cross critical thresholds, and then abruptly and irreversibly
change.”). Tipping points can be triggered between a warming of 1.0° and 2.0 °
Celsius. Id. Without a drastic decline in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030,
global warming will increase by 1.6° Celsius in the following decades. Id.
28. Hotz & Puko, supra note 23.
29. Id.
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For this reason, 192 nations have joined the Paris
Agreement30 to slow global warming to 2° Celsius and preferably
1.5° Celsius above the pre-industrial average global temperature
and committed to specific, country-by-country greenhouse gas
emission
reductions
called
“Nationally
Determined
Contributions” or NDCs.31 Unfortunately, early in former U.S.
President Trump’s Administration, he terminated the U.S.’s
membership in the Paris Agreement, few countries are meeting
their NDCs, and countries’ NDCs were not nearly aggressive
enough to slow global warming significantly in any case.32
Accordingly, the world has become increasingly warmer since
the Paris Agreement was signed in 2015.33
The looming global warming crisis has generated numerous
reactions and proposed solutions, including a suggestion that the
U.S. military could invade Brazil someday if Brazil continues to
permit the destruction of its Amazon carbon sink.34 Shortly after
U.S. President Biden’s inauguration on January 20, 2021, his
new Special Climate Envoy, John Kerry, announced that the
U.S. was rejoining the Paris Agreement.35 In addition, President
Biden suspended new fossil fuel mining leases on federal lands
and waters, and instructed his Cabinet members to terminate
any subsidies that their agencies provided to the fossil fuel
industry.36 It should be noted, however, that many fossil fuel

30. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104, http://unfccc.int/files
/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement
.pdf [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
31. See infra notes 192–98 and accompanying text.
32. See infra note 183 and accompanying text; infra notes 223–25 and
accompanying text.
33. Infra notes 226, 413.
34. Stephen M. Walt, Who Will Invade Brazil to Save the Amazon, FOREIGN
POL’Y (Aug. 5, 2019, 5:31 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/05/who-willinvade-brazil-to-save-the-amazon/ (arguing that, if Brazil continues to destroy
the Amazon rainforest, other countries, including the U.S., someday could feel
forced to invade Brazil to save the Amazon rainforest and ameliorate the effects
of global climate change); see also Aaron Gell, People Are Seriously Talking
About Invading Brazil to Save the Planet, MEDIUM: GEN (Sept. 24, 2019),
https://gen.medium.com/people-are-seriously-talking-about-invading-brazil-tosave-the-planet-dd94bc5bdf65.
35. Kerry Says US ‘Proud to be Back’ in Paris Climate Agreement, VOICE
AM.: NEWS (Jan. 25, 2021, 8:40 PM), https://www.voanews.com/usa/kerry-saysus-proud-be-back-paris-climate-agreement.
36. See Joe Khalil, Elyse Russo & Char’Nese Turner, Biden Pauses Oil and
Gas Leases, Cuts Subsidies in ‘Bold’ Climate Steps, NEWS NATION (Jan. 27,
2021, 9:35 PM), https://www.newsnationnow.com/politics/biden-100days/biden-
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subsidies are provided in the form of federal tax breaks,37 and
the U.S. Congress, not the U.S. Executive Branch, would have to
amend the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to abolish such
subsidies.38
“Cap and trade” programs—in which an overall cap on
emissions is implemented and then the companies and
individuals affected can trade emissions among themselves—
have been successful in lowering carbon emissions in certain
locales,39 and several writers have proposed, as an alternative to
a cap and trade program, the imposition of a carbon tax so that
those developing and selling fossil fuels are forced to internalize
the true cost of fossil fuels.40 Some have advocated that
to-pause-oil-and-gas-sales-on-public-lands/ (discussing the executive actions
President Biden signed to combat climate change).
37. See, e.g., Fact Sheet: Fossil Fuel Subsidies: A Closer Look at Tax Breaks
and Societal Costs, ENV’T & ENERGY STUDY INST. (July 29, 2019),
https://www.eesi.org/files/FactSheet_Fossil_Fuel_Subsidies_0719.pdf
[hereinafter Fact Sheet] (“Numerous energy subsidies exist in the U.S. tax code
to promote or subsidize the production of cheap and abundant fossil energy.”);
Timothy Gardner, Biden Tax Plan Replaces U.S. Fossil Fuel Subsidies with
Clean Energy Incentives, REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2021, 10:58 AM), https://www.reute
rs.com/article/us-usa-treasury-tax-energy/biden-tax-plan-replaces-u-s-fossil-fu
el-subsidies-with-clean-energy-incentives-idUSKBN2BU2HL (“Unwinding tax
breaks on fossil fuel companies could face opposition from Biden’s fellow
Democrats in the U.S. Congress from energy-producing states.”).
38. See Lili Pike, Fossil Fuels Get Too Many Government Handouts. Biden
Wants to Cut Them Off., VOX (Apr. 5, 2021, 1:40 PM), https://www.vox.com
/22363539/oil-gas-subsidies-biden-solar-wind-tax-reform-infrastructure-bill
(explaining how many of the biggest reforms require congressional support); see
Shannon Osaka, Biden is Canceling Fossil Fuel Subsidies. But He Can’t End
Them All., GRIST (Jan. 28, 2021), https://grist.org/politics/biden-is-eliminatingfossil-fuel-subsidies-but-he-cant-end-them-all/ (explaining how “only a fraction
of those subsidies are within Biden’s purview as president”).
39. See Benjamin Goldstein, Learning from Europe: Designing Cap-andTrade Programs that Work, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 1, 2007, 9:00 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2007/06/01/3173/learning
-from-europe-designing-cap-and-trade-programs-that-work/ (discussing the
cap-and-trade system in the EU); Richard Schmalensee & Robert Stavins,
Learning from Thirty Years of Cap and Trade, RESOURCES (May 16, 2019),
https://www.resources.org/archives/learning-thirty-years-cap-trade/
(looking
back on the history of cap-and-trade programs as more jurisdictions adopt the
policy); Bob Sussman, The Return of Cap and Trade is Good News for
U.S. Climate Policy, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.brookings
.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2015/10/21/the-return-of-cap-and-trade-is-good-newsfor-u-s-climate-policy/ (discussing the comeback of cap-and-trade policies in the
U.S. and internationally).
40. See Int’l Monetary Fund Fiscal Affairs Dep’t, Fiscal Policies for Paris
Climate Strategies—From Principle to Practice, INT’L MONETARY FUND (May 1,
2019), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2019/05/01/Fis
cal-Policies-for-Paris-Climate-Strategies-from-Principle-to-Practice-46826
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governments simply outlaw the extraction, refinement, and sale
of fossil fuels (and not compensate people and entities engaging
in such activities) on the ground that these activities cause
global warming and consequently constitute a public nuisance.41
In addition, numerous civil liability lawsuits have been filed
against major fossil fuel companies, such as Exxon Mobil Corp.,
for causing global warming and misleading investors and the
public about the dangers of global warming caused by fossil
fuels,42 and Senators and former U.S. Presidential candidates
Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders have even gone so far as
to argue that oil company executives should be prosecuted
criminally for hiding the fact that their products were destroying
the planet.43
At the same time, the U.S. provides pre-tax subsidies
(meaning subsidies that don’t take into account negative
externalities,44 or costs imposed on society by a party that does
(presenting a “spreadsheet tool for judging the likely impact on emissions, fiscal
revenues, local air pollution mortality, and economic welfare impacts of a range
of instruments including comprehensive carbon taxes.”); see Gilbert Metcalf,
New (Republican) Support for a Carbon Tax, ECONOFACT (Feb. 10, 2017),
https://econofact.org/new-republican-support-for-a-carbon-tax (discussing the
details and potential consequences of a carbon tax proposal); Kyle Pomerleau &
Elke Asen, Carbon Tax and Revenue Recycling: Revenue, Economic, and
Distributional Implications, TAX FOUND. (Nov. 6, 2019), https://taxfoundation.o
rg/carbon-tax/ (discussing some of the benefits for businesses of a carbon tax);
Why Put a Price on Carbon, CITIZENS’ CLIMATE LOBBY, https://citizensclimatelo
bby.org/price-on-carbon/?gclid=Cj0KCQjw5auGBhDEARIsAFyNm9FZ6NzGye
kO6zYqWx_WM_gdYPZqR1WZkaeOwFl_xLK4zE-DiX80EIMaAiMwEALw_wc
B (last visited Oct. 26, 2021) (discussing the benefits of a general carbon tax
scheme).
41. Fossil Fuel-Based Vehicle Bans Across the World, REUTERS (Nov. 18,
2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/climate-change-britain-factbox/fossil-fu
el-based-vehicle-bans-across-the-world-idINKBN27Y19F; Roland Geyer, It’s
Unavoidable: We Must Ban Fossil Fuels to Save Our Planet. Here’s How We Do
It, GUARDIAN (Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/202
1/mar/09/its-unavoidable-we-must-ban-fossil-fuels-to-save-our-planet-hereshow-we-do-it (using past bans on leaded gasoline and chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs) as examples of how bans can mitigate environmental disaster).
42. See Umair Irfan, Bernie Sanders Wants to Take Fossil Fuel Companies
to Criminal Court, VOX, (Nov. 20, 2019) https://www.vox.com/2019/11/12
/20959293/bernie-sanders-climate-lawsuit-exxon-juliana-sinnok
(“Several
climate change lawsuits against fossil fuel companies and governments are now
proceeding to trial and one suit may even yield a verdict soon.”).
43. Id.
44. See David Coady et al., Global Fossil Fuel Subsidies Remain Large: An
Update Based on Country-Level Estimates 7–8 (Int’l Monetary Fund (IMF),
Working Paper No. WP/19/89, May 2019), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications
/WP/Issues/2019/05/02/Global-Fossil-Fuel-Subsidies-Remain-Large-An-Update
-Based-on-Country-Level-Estimates-46509.
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not pay for those costs),45 such as local air pollution and global
warming,46 to fossil fuel companies in the amount of
approximately $118.1 billion per year.47 Such subsidies make it
difficult politically and legally to establish that extracting and
selling fossil fuels constitutes a public nuisance.48 Of course,
numerous individuals and companies around the world are also
developing a wide range of greenhouse gas-reducing
technologies and alternative energy sources.49 Most of the world
agrees that global warming is a serious problem,50 but
governments’ responses are uncoordinated and inconsistent,51
and ultimately little progress is being made to slow global
warming.52
The world’s atmosphere is a natural resource owned by all
people and it is understandable that no country wants to do the
lion’s share of the work to protect it for everyone.53 However, if
human beings wish to survive, they must find a way to work

45. See Externalities – The Economic Lowdown Podcast Series, FED. RSRV.
BANK OF ST. LOUIS (Sept. 2012), https://www.stlouisfed.org/education/economic
-lowdown-podcast-series/episode-11-externalities [hereinafter
Externalities].
46. Nghia-Piotr Trong Le et al., IMF Energy Subsidies Template, IMF,
https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Topics/Environment/energy-subsidies/fuel
-subsidies-template.ashx (last updated Mar. 2019).
47. See infra Figure 8.
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
49. See, e.g., Mary Beth O’Leary, Tackling Greenhouse Gases, MIT NEWS
(Jan. 7, 2019), https://news.mit.edu/2019/tackling-greenhouse-gases-mechanica
l-engineering-0107 (discussing how faculty in the Department of Mechanical
Engineering are developing technologies that store, capture, convert, and
minimize greenhouse gas emissions); Anca Gagiuc, New Power Source:
Neutrinovoltaic Energy, COM. PROP. EXECUTIVE (Aug. 23, 2020),
https://www.commercialsearch.com/news/new-power-source-neutrinovoltaicenergy/ (revealing that scientists at the Neutrino Energy Group, a research
institute in Berlin, are developing a new source of renewable energy called
neutrinovoltaic energy).
50. Hotz & Puko, supra note 23.
51. See, e.g., Mary Robinson, Climate Catastrophe Can Be Averted If
Leaders Act Now, IRISH TIMES (Aug. 14, 2021, 12:55 AM), https://www.irishtim
es.com/opinion/mary-robinson-climate-catastrophe-can-be-averted-if-leadersact-now-1.4646354 (stating that national responses to climate change have been
“fitful, inconsistent and uncoordinated”).
52. Press Release, Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 2020 Tied for
Warmest Year on Record, NASA Analysis Shows (Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.n
asa.gov/press-release/2020-tied-for-warmest-year-on-record-nasa-analysis-sho
ws [hereinafter 2020 Tied for Warmest Year on Record].
53. See, e.g., infra note 178.
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together to slow climate change.54 Moreover, it is clear that the
international community needs to take drastic action now to
slow global warming,55 and all possible strategies for reaching
that goal should be considered.56
This article considers whether the international
community, and whether the U.S. in particular, should promote
the execution of conservation easements in which owners of
fossil fuels agree not to extract, refine, sell or distribute those
fossil fuels, in exchange for a public financial benefit. Again, this
is the agreement that former President Rafael Correa was
offering to make with the international community on behalf of
Ecuador back in 2007.57 Furthermore, this article views this
question from the perspective of U.S. land use law and the
economic theory of property rights, which is discussed further
below.58 Accordingly, the ultimate question addressed in this
article is whether the execution of such conservation easements
could be an economically efficient method of slowing global
warming,59 and the analysis presented in this article suggests
that the answer to this question is “yes.”60
In considering this question, it should be kept in mind that
an owner of fossil fuels could be a private person/entity or a
government. Furthermore, a wealthier government typically can
simply prohibit the exploitation of government-owned fossil
fuels.61 In contrast, a poorer government typically would need to
54. See, e.g., Our Planet, Our Future: Fighting Climate Change Together,
EUR. COMM’N (Sept. 19 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/youth
/docs/youth_magazine_en.pdf (stating that slowing climate change is “going to
need huge efforts from all of us individuals, governments, businesses, schools
and other organizations, working together”).
55. See, e.g., Global Issues: Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS, https://ww
w.un.org/en/global-issues/climate-change (last visited June 17, 2021); Timothy
Puko, U.N. Panel Warns Drastic Action Needed to Stave Off Climate Change,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-n-panel-warns-drast
ic-action-needed-to-stave-off-climate-change-1538960400.
56. See, e.g., Isabella Suarez, 5 Strategies That Achieve Climate Mitigation
and Adaptation Simultaneously, WORLD RES. INST. (Feb. 10, 2010), https://www
.wri.org/insights/5-strategies-achieve-climate-mitigation-and-adaptation-simul
taneously (stating that governments should pursue any reasonable method of
mitigating climate change and adjusting to it).
57. See supra text accompanying notes 1–10.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 88–115.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 250–406.
60. Id.
61. For example, as stated above, immediately upon being elected the U.S.
President, President Biden suspended all new fossil fuel leases on federal lands
and waters. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin & Dino Grandoni, Biden Poised to Halt
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be compensated for implementing such a prohibition, as it
otherwise typically would need to exploit its fossil fuels to lift its
population out of poverty.62
In Section II, I explain the basic mechanics of how a
conservation easement works in the U.S. In Section III, I discuss
the property law framework through which I am approaching
the problem of global warming. In Section IV, I review the
science of climate change, and in Section V, I review the major
legal commitments that the international community has made
regarding global warming. In Section VI, I set forth the specific
amendments to the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) that I propose
the U.S. Congress adopt to implement the conservation
easements discussed here. In Section VII, I discuss whether
prohibiting fossil fuel owners’ extraction, refinement, sale, and
distribution of fossil fuels through conservation easements is an
economically efficient method of slowing global warming, and, in
Section VIII, I conclude.
II. CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
A conservation easement is a voluntary agreement, typically
between a governmental entity or conservation land trust, in
which the landowner agrees to use or refrain from using the land
in a particular manner (e.g., maintain it as an open space or as
a refuge for an endangered species), typically in exchange for a
tax benefit.63 A conservation land trust is a non-profit
corporation that acquires and manages donated lands and
conservation easements for the purpose of limiting the

New Fossil Fuel Leasing on Federal Land and Water Wednesday, WASH. POST
(Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2021/01
/25/biden-drilling-moratorium/.
62. See, e.g., Kestenbaum, supra note 1 (statement of former Ecuadorian
President Rafael Correa) (discussing the need to exploit the Yasuní oil fields to
help the poor of Ecuador since the international community would not pay
Ecuador not to drill in the Yasuní).
63. What You Can Do, LAND TR. ALL., https://www.landtrustalliance.org
/what-you-can-do (last visited June 17, 2021); Elizabeth Hughes, Terrain,
Taxes, and Land Trusts: Saving the Florida Panther Through the Use of
Conservation Easements, 94 FLA. BAR J. 53 (2020), https://www.floridabar
.org/the-florida-bar-journal/terrain-taxes-and-land-trusts-saving-the-florida-pa
nther-through-the-use-of-conservation-easements/. A conservation easement
may not only lower the donor’s federal and state income taxes, but it may also
lower the donor’s federal estate taxes and state property taxes. Id.; see also
Estate Tax Incentives for Land Conservation: Keeping Land in the Family, LAND
TR. ALL., https://www.landtrustalliance.org/topics/taxes/estate-tax-incentivesland-conservation (last visited June 18, 2021).
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development of the lands in question.64 In the U.S., for example,
under Section 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), a
landowner generally can take a charitable deduction on the
taxpayer’s federal tax return for the diminution in the value of
the land concerned attributable to an agreement to dedicate all
or a portion of the land to one of the following uses:
(1) preserving land for outdoor recreational use by, or education of, the
general public; (2) protecting relatively natural habitats of fish, wildlife
or plants; (3) preserving open space (including farmland or forest
space) for scenic enjoyment of the general public or under a
governmental conservation policy yielding significant public benefit; or
(4) preserving a historically important land area or certified historic
structure.65

Generally speaking, a tax deduction under Section 170(h) of
the IRC is available only if the land restriction is perpetual66 and
“[t]he value of a conservation easement is the fair market value
of the easement at the time of contribution.”67 Further, the date
that the deed of easement is recorded pursuant to state law is
the date of contribution for federal tax purposes.68 A “qualified
appraiser” (as defined in IRC 170(f)(11)(E)) must be used to
calculate the value of the easement,69 and an appraiser should
investigate whether there have been sales of comparable
easements as such sale prices typically would constitute the best
evidence of the value of the easement.70 However, if the
appraiser cannot find a record of comparable sales (which often
is the case), the appraiser should calculate the value of the
easement as the difference between the value of the land without
the restriction and the value of the land with the restriction,
taking into account all relevant information.71 If an individual
or corporate taxpayer takes a conservation deduction and then
violates the easement, the deduction previously granted to the

64. Richard Brewer, CONSERVANCY: THE LAND TRUST MOVEMENT IN
AMERICA 1 (Univ. Press of New Engl. 2003); Andrew Loza, What is a Land
Trust, WECONSERVEPA, https://conservationtools.org/guides/150-what-is-a-lan
d-trust (last visited June 18, 2021).
65. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(4)(A).
66. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(5)(A).
67. Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV. 43 (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/conservation_easem
ent.pdf [hereinafter Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide] (citing
Treas. Reg. §1.170A-14(h)(3)(i)).
68. Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(C)(3)(ii)(C)).
69. Id. at 41.
70. Id. at 43.
71. Id. at 43–44 (citing Treas. Reg. §1.170A-14(h)(3)(ii)).
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landowner is denied and the landowner must pay the taxes owed
without the deduction as well as penalties.72
At the same time, for an individual taxpayer, partnership,
S corporation, or other pass-through entity (in which the entity’s
tax benefits and liabilities are passed down to the individual
owners), the total amount of the deduction cannot exceed 50% of
the taxpayer’s contribution base73 (which, in most cases, means
the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income (AGI) for the year in which
the easement was granted),74 although any excess value of the
easement not claimed in the first year may be carried over to the
taxpayer’s federal returns for each of the fifteen succeeding
years.75 If an individual taxpayer is a rancher or farmer, the
total amount of the deduction cannot exceed 100% of the
taxpayer’s contribution base,76 and again any excess value of the
easement not claimed in the first year may be carried over to the
taxpayer’s fifteen subsequent tax returns.77 If the property in
question appreciated during the period in which the taxpayer
owned it, lower percentages of the taxpayer’s contribution basis
would apply.78
For a corporation (other than a farmer or rancher), the total
amount of the deduction in general cannot exceed 10% of the
corporation’s taxable income for the year,79 and for a farmer or
rancher, the total amount of the deduction cannot exceed 100%
of the farmer or rancher’s taxable income for the year.80 For any
type of corporate taxpayer, any excess value of the easement not
claimed in the first year may be carried over to the corporation’s
fifteen subsequent tax returns.81
While the fifteen-year carryover provision in the IRC
suggests that many taxpayers ultimately can deduct 100% of the
value of a conservation easement on their federal income tax
return, it should be kept in mind that the deduction still only

36.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

26 U.S.C. § 6662.
26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(E)(i).
26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(E)(i).
26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(E)(ii).
26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(E)(iv)(I).
Id.
Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide , supra note 67, at 35–

79. 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(2)(D).
80. 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(2)(A); see also Conservation Easement Audit
Techniques Guide, supra note 67, at 36.
81. Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide, supra note 67, at 36–
37.
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reduces the taxpayer’s taxes by an amount equal to the value of
the easement multiplied by the taxpayer’s tax rate. For example,
assuming that the total value of a conservation easement was
$100,000, that the taxpayer was able to deduct that total value
over a number of years, and that the taxpayer’s tax rate was
20%, the taxpayer’s taxes would only have been reduced by
$20,000. Several U.S. states today provide a tax credit, rather
than a tax deduction, for a conservation easement,82 and as
discussed further below in Section VII, the U.S. Congress may
need to provide a tax credit for 100% of the value of the
conservation easement (100% of the value of the taxpayer’s fossil
fuel operation) to entice fossil fuel owners to grant conservation
easements in which they agree not to extract, refine, sell or
distribute those fuels.83 In addition, while a taxpayer in the U.S.
can itemize the taxpayer’s deductions and take advantage of the
IRC Section 170(h) conservation easement charitable deduction
provision to maintain the land as a carbon sink today,84 the U.S.
Congress would have to amend the IRC to allow a tax deduction
or credit specifically for an agreement not to extract, refine, sell,
or distribute fossil fuels owned by the taxpayer.85 At the same
time, such legislation should not face significant opposition

82. State Tax Credits for Donation of a Conservation Easement, LAND
CONSERVATION ASSISTANCE NETWORK, https://www.landcan.org/article/statetax-credits-for-donation-of-a-conservation-easement/1616 (last visited June 18,
2021). Most such states impose a significant cap on such a credit, but several
states permit the taxpayer to transfer his or her credit to another taxpayer. Id.
For example, Colorado provides a tax credit of 50% of the first $100,000 of the
value of the conservation easement, and then 50% of the remainder of the value,
up to a cap of $1.5 million. Russell Shay, State Land Conservation Tax
Incentives as of April, 2019, LAND TR. ALL., http://s3.amazonaws.com/landtrust
alliance.org/State-Land-Conservation-Tax-Incentives-April-2019.pdf
(last
visited June 18, 2021). Georgia provides a tax credit of 25% of the value of the
donation up to a maximum of $250,000. Id. New Mexico provides a tax credit of
50% of the value of a conservation easement donation, up to a cap of $250,000
per year, for a total of 20 years. Id. All three of these tax credits are transferable,
i.e., they can be sold to other taxpayers. Id.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 233–38.
84. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(4)(i)–(iv).
85. See, e.g., Devon Ryan, New Analysis Suggests Ways for Landowners to
Limit Fracking and Mineral Extraction Without Regulations, STAN. NEWS (Feb.
1, 2017), https://news.stanford.edu/2017/02/01/stanford-analysis-suggests-ways
-landowners-limit-fracking-mineral-extraction-without-regulations/
(“For
states where [mineral estate conservation easement (MECEs)] might not be
legally supported, the analysis proposes amendments to state laws and the
Internal Revenue Code that would allow MECEs to reach parity with the
current use of conservation easements and be eligible for tax deductions.”).
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because a conservation easement is voluntary,86 and the income
tax laws in a few states already provide for a deduction or credit
for conservation easements.87
The specific amendments to the IRC that I propose the U.S.
Congress adopt to implement the conservation easements
advocated for in this article are discussed below, in Section VI.
III. PROPERTY LAW FRAMEWORK
Most nations around the world recognize private property
ownership,88 and most economists and development experts
agree that private property regimes experience greater economic
growth than communal property regimes.89 Most property law
scholars likewise agree that a private property regime is
preferable to a common property regime in general.90 What
distinguishes most property law scholars around the world is
whether they maintain that the private property rights that are
recognized today are “natural” and “morally-justified”91 or, in
contrast, are utilitarian in nature, meaning that they are “a
mere artifact – a human invention, a social institution.”92 Most

86. See id. (“A conservation easement is a contract (usually between a
landowner and a land trust) whereby a landowner voluntarily agrees to sell or
donate the right to use a piece of property in a certain way, commonly agreeing
not to develop it.”).
87. Legislation in Alaska, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Wyoming already provides for a deduction or
a credit for such a conservation easement. Ryan, supra note 85.
88. See, e.g., Property rights - Country Rankings, GLOBAL E CON.,
https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/herit_property_rights/
(last
visited Dec. 30, 2020).
89. See, e.g., Laura Tuck & Wael Zakout, 7 Reasons for Land and Property
Rights to be at the Top of the Global Agenda, WORLD BANK BLOGS (Mar. 25,
2019), https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/7-reasons-land-and-property-rightsbe-top-global-agenda; Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57
AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967) (setting forth a spirited economic defense of private
property and, in particular, arguing that the “primary function of property
rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization of
externalities”).
90. See, e.g., James E. Krier, Of Property Rights and Rights to Property, 41
OHIO N. U. L. REV. 589, 591 (2015) https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcon
tent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=2781&context
=articles.
91. Sukhninder Panesar, Theories of Private Property in Modern Property
Law, 15 DENNING L.J. 113 (2012), https://web.nmsu.edu/~jvessel/PrivatePrope
rty-SP.pdf.
92. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY: CONCISE EDITION 36 (Wolters
Kluwer 2d ed. 2017).
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property law scholars around the world today subscribe to the
utilitarian theory of property rights.93
Those utilitarian scholars who more specifically believe that
the primary purpose of property rights is to “enhance social
welfare by maximizing the value of scarce resources” or
distributing scarce resources as efficiently as possible are
adherents of the economic theory of property rights.94 Efficiency
here means “Pareto efficiency,” named after the Italian
economist and engineer Vilfredo Pareto, meaning that no change
to the distribution scheme can be made to make anyone better
off without making someone else worse off.95 In the economic
theory of property rights, “[p]roperty rights are thought to
perform this value-maximizing function by ‘internalizing
externalities’ . . . i.e., bringing the costs of the resource’s use to
bear on the user.”96 As indicated above, this statement is
referring to a negative externality, which is a cost of a use
imposed on others for which the user does not have to pay.97 A
positive externality is a benefit of a use bestowed on others for
which the user is not paid.98 This paper addresses how the Paris
Agreement parties could increase the chance that they achieve
the goal of the Paris Agreement to limit the increase in the
average global temperature to 2° Celsius and preferably 1.5°
Celsius and thereby slow global warming, through the lens of the
economic theory of property rights.
Climate change, of course, is caused by damage to a very
unusual type of property—the earth’s atmosphere—which, as
stated above, is a natural resource that is owned by all of
humanity.99 Some would go so far as to argue that the

93. Id. at 36; see, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Utilitarian Foundations of
Natural Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 711, 714 (1989).
94. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 92, at 35.
95. See, e.g., William B.T. Mock, Pareto Optimality, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
GLOBAL JUSTICE. (Chatterjee D.K. eds., 2011), https://doi.org/10.1007/9781-4020-9160-5_341.
96. DUKEMINIER ET. AL, supra note 92, at 36.
97. See, e.g., Externalities, supra note 45.
98. Id.
99. Some writers argue that the earth’s atmosphere is not part of the
“common heritage of mankind” (CHM) which all nations have explicitly agreed
to protect. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3; Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present
Generations Towards Future Generations, (Nov. 12, 1997) United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. arts. 4, 8. The CHM as a
principle in international law is most “commonly attributed to then-Maltese
Ambassador Arvid Pardo who stated in a memorandum dated 17 August 1967
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atmosphere is not actually property at all, as no one has the right
to exclude anyone else from utilizing it.100 As a commonly-owned
natural resource, it is subject to the economic phenomenon
known as “the tragedy of the commons,” which is most associated
with Garrett Hardin, who popularized this phenomenon in his
1968 essay of the same name.101 By this phrase, Hardin (and
others before him) meant that, with a communally-owned
natural resource, each individual will use the resource as much
as possible because the costs that he or she imposes will be
spread across all users, and ultimately, as a result, the
commonly-owned natural resource typically is ruined.102 Again,
in the economics field, those costs which a user imposes on others
but for which the user does not have to pay are referred to as
“negative externalities.”103
Hardin posited that the tragedy of the commons can be
averted in only one of two different ways: adoption of “private
property, or something formally like it,” or “mutual coercion,
mutually agreed upon.”104 Hardin’s proposition that a
commonly-owned natural resource could be protected through
adoption of “private property, or something formally like it”105 is

to the U.N. Secretary General that ‘the time has come to declare the seabed and
the ocean-floor a common heritage of mankind.’” Seokwoo Lee & Jeong Woo
Kim, Applying the Principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind: An East-Asian
Perspective, in GLOBAL COMMONS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (Kenuuan Zou, ed.,
2018). Given the linkage of the CHM with the seabed and ocean floor, it is not
clear that all nations would consider the earth’s atmosphere to be part of the
CHM. Id.; The Common Heritage of Mankind and Four Other Problem Areas,
UNITED NATIONS UNIV. (Dec. 30, 2020), https://archive.unu.edu/unupress/unup
books/uu15oe/uu15oe0q.htm. Some writers have argued that the earth’s
atmosphere is a part of the CHM. See, e.g., Prue Taylor, AN ECOLOGICAL
APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW: RESPONDING TO CHALLENGES OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 275 (1998). In any case, the earth’s atmosphere unquestionably is a
commonly-owned natural resource, as it is not the private property of any single
human being, group of human beings, or country, and, in the Paris Agreement,
the nations of the world recognized that they must work together to protect this
resource. Paris Agreement, supra note 30, arts. 3, 4. For this reason, protecting
the world’s atmosphere is considered at least a “common concern of
humankind.” See, e.g., Nico Schrijver, Managing the Global Commons: Common
Good or Common Sink?, 37(7) THIRD WORLD Q. 1252, 1263 (2016),
https://doi.org/10,1080/01436597.2016.1154441.
100. Krier, supra note 90, at 591 n.8.
101. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243,
1243–48 (1968).
102. Id. at 1244.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1245, 1247.
105. Id.
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supported by the Coase theorem in economics, named after
Ronald Coase, who first posited it in 1960.106 The Coase theorem
maintains that the parties involved in a dispute over use of a
resource will be able to bargain to an efficient outcome,
regardless of which party is awarded the property rights, if there
is a competitive economy with complete information, zero
transaction costs, and a clear definition of property rights.107
Coase’s theorem is especially widely applied to activities (such
as the emission of greenhouse gases) that impose a negative
externality on others.108
Land use law, environmental law, and the major
international agreements on climate change are all based to an
extent on Hardin’s and Coase’s theories.109 For example, once
the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) agreed that people around the globe
are entitled to an atmosphere that does not cause severe effects
due to global warming, the developed countries to date are
largely responsible for greenhouse gas emissions and hence
global warming, and the developing countries to date have
suffered the most severe effects of global warming, the parties
could then establish the Green Climate Fund (funded by the
developed countries for the developing countries to use to reduce
their greenhouse gas emissions and adjust to climate change)110
and negotiate the Paris Agreement, in accordance with Coase’s

106. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), http://
www.jstor.org/stable/724810.
107. Id. at 8.
108. See, e.g., Robert S. Pindyck, Coase Lecture—Taxes, Targets and the
Social Cost of Carbon, 84 ECONOMICA 345 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1111/ecca.1
2243.
109. See, e.g., John Burrit McArthur, International Environmental Law:
Can it Overcome its Weaknesses to Create an Effective Remedy for Global
Warming?, 10 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 253, 256 n.12, 266 n.71 (2013),
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/scujil/vol10/iss2/9; Jouni Paavola, Climate
Change: The Ultimate ‘Tragedy of the Commons’? 9–18 (Ctr. for Climate Change
Econ. & Pol’y, Sustainability Rsch. Inst., Working Paper 53, 2011), https://ww
w.cccep.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/WP53_climate-change-tragedycommons.pdf.
110. About GCF, GREEN CLIMATE FUND. (Apr. 3, 2021) https://www.greencli
mate.fund/about; Green Climate Fund, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/funds-andfinancial-entities/green-climate-fund (last updated July 16, 2021); Green
Climate Fund Directors Warn It Faces Staffing Crisis, CLIMATE CHANGE NEWS,
https://www.climatechangenews.com/2015/10/16/green-climate-fund-directorswarn-it-faces-staffing-crisis/ (Oct. 16, 2015); Paris Agreement, supra note 30, at
arts. 2.2, 4.5, 9.
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theorem.111 Furthermore, given that the Paris Agreement
parties were unwilling to adopt a system of “mutual coercion,”
each party instead agreed to publish non-binding, evolving
“nationally
determined
[greenhouse
gas
reduction]
contributions” (NDCs) and utilize a wide range of public and
“private property” or marketing measures to meet those NDCs,
in accordance with Hardin’s theory.112 The Paris Agreement
parties, through their NDCs, have agreed how the burden of
decreasing greenhouse emissions and slowing global warming
should be distributed.113
Unfortunately, to date, the global climate change
agreements have failed to slow global warming.114 An economic
analysis of how the parties may increase the likelihood of
achieving the goal of the Paris Agreement involves determining
how the parties can decrease their greenhouse gas emissions at
the lowest possible cost.115 As mentioned above, this article more
specifically considers whether the execution of conservation
easements in which fossil fuel owners agree not to extract,
refine, sell, or distribute their fuels could be an economically
efficient method of slowing global warming.
IV. THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE
“Climate change” refers to any long-term change in weather
patterns,116 and global warming “is the long-term heating of
Earth’s climate system . . . due to human activities, primarily
fossil fuel burning . . . .”117 However, as the biggest change in our
weather patterns for a number of years has been caused by
global warming, climate scientists and the public often use the
terms
“climate
change”
and
“global
warming”

111. Pindyck, supra note 108.
112. See, e.g., Paris Agreement, supra note 30, at art. 6; JANE A. LEGGETT &
RICHARD K. LATTANZIO, CONG. RSCH. SERV. R44609, CLIMATE CHANGE:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE 2015 PARIS AGREEMENT, 6–12
(2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44609.pdf.
113. Paris Agreement, supra note 30, at art. 4.
114. Infra text accompanying note 407.
115. Supra text accompanying note 95.
116. See, e.g., What is Climate Change?, DAVID SUZUKI FOUND. (Nov. 3,
2020),
https://davidsuzuki.org/what-you-can-do/what-is-climate-change/
[hereinafter DAVIDSUZUKI.ORG]; Overview: Weather, Global Warming and
Climate Change, NASA JET PROPULSION LAB, https://climate.nasa.gov
/resources/global-warming-vs-climate-change/ (last updated Nov. 17, 2020)
[hereinafter NASA JET PROPULSION LAB].
117. NASA JET PROPULSION LAB, supra note 116.
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interchangeably.118 Accordingly, in this paper, the terms are
used interchangeably as well.
Global warming is caused by a great increase in the
concentration of greenhouse gases in the earth’s atmosphere.119
Greenhouse gases are “those gaseous constituents of the
atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and
emit radiation at specific wavelengths within the spectrum of
infrared radiation emitted by the Earth’s surface, the
atmosphere, and clouds.”120 The greenhouse gases cause global
warming by reflecting back to the earth energy from the sun
which has bounced off of the earth, just as a giant greenhouse
surrounding the globe would do (and hence these gases have
come to be referred to as “greenhouse gases”).121
The major greenhouse gases are water vapor, carbon dioxide
(CO2,), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and various
fluorinated gases (hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons
(PFCs), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), and nitrogen trifluoride
(NF3)).122 Some of these gases are naturally present in the
earth’s atmosphere.123 For example, human beings breathe in
oxygen and expel CO2,124 and cows and other large livestock
expel significant amounts of methane.125 However, humans have
significantly increased the emissions of these natural
greenhouse gases.126 Furthermore, the fluorinated gases are

118. Id.; DAVIDSUZUKI.ORG, supra note 116.
119. See, e.g., Climate Change Indicators: Greenhouse Gases, ENV’T PROT.
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/greenhouse-gases (last visited
Nov. 3, 2020).
120. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, (Martin Parry et al. eds,
2007), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/ar4_wg2_full_report.
pdf.
121. See, e.g., Global Climate Change: The Causes of Climate Change, NASA,
https://climate.nasa.gov/causes/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2020) [hereinafter Global
Climate Change]; ClimateKids: Meet the Greenhouse Gases, NASA, https://clima
tekids.nasa.gov/greenhouse-cards/ (last updated Oct. 6, 2021).
122. See, e.g., Melissa Denchak, Greenhouse Effect 101, NAT’L RESOURCES
DEFENSE COUNCIL (July 16, 2019), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/greenhouseeffect-101.
123. Id.
124. Sabine De Brabandere, How Do We Breathe?, SCI. AM. (May 16, 2019),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-do-we-breathe.
125. Global Climate Change: Which is a Bigger Methane Source: Cow
Belching or Cow Flatulence?, NASA, https://climate.nasa.gov/faq/33/which-is-abigger-methane-source-cow-belching-or-cow-flatulence/ (last visited Nov, 4,
2020).
126. Global Climate Change, supra note 121.
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manmade.127 In sum, since the commencement of the Industrial
Revolution in the 1750’s, there has been a significant increase in
the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, and
the rate of this increase has itself increased exponentially in
recent decades.128
For example, the rate of growth of CO2, the gas responsible
for 81% of the increased warming of the earth’s atmosphere,
“averaged about 1.6 ppm per year in the 1980s and 1.5 ppm per
year in the 1990s . . . .”129 Then, the mean growth rate increased
to 2.3 ppm per year on average from 2009 to 2018, and in 2018,
carbon dioxide increased by 2.5 ppm.130 The concentration of
methane in the atmosphere has also been accelerating.131 For
example, it increased 50% between 2007 and 2013.132 Climate
scientists have warned for years that there likely will be a
tipping point, “when the planet reaches a threshold of
irreversible climate change and the worse effects—extreme
drought, sea level rise, monster wildfires and hurricanes—
become not the exception but the norm[,]”133 and they estimate
today that this tipping point could be reached by 2030 in
general134 and may have already been reached with respect to
some aspects of global warming.135 When a tipping point has
been reached, scientists maintain, the earth’s ability to absorb
additional CO2 will decline, “creat[ing] a destructive landatmosphere feedback loop that could dramatically accelerate the
worst effects of global warming.”136

127. Denchak, supra note 122.
128. What Are the Greenhouse Gas Changes Since the Industrial
Revolution?, AM. CHEMICAL SOC’Y, https://www.acs.org/content/acs/en/climate
science/greenhousegases/industrialrevolution.html. (last visited Nov. 4, 2020)
(“CO2, for instance, never increased more than 30 ppm [parts per million] during
any previous 1,000-year period . . . but has already risen by 30 ppm in the past
two decades.”).
129. Rising Emissions Drive Greenhouse Gas Index increase, NAT’L OCEANIC
AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (May 21, 2019), https://research.noaa.gov/article
/ArtMID/587/ArticleID/2455/RISING-EMISSIONS-DRIVE-GREENHOUSEGAS-INDEX-INCREASER.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Jonathan Hahn, Climate Could Hit a Tipping Point Sooner Than You
Think, SIERRA CLUB (Jan. 26, 2019), https://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/climatecould-hit-tipping-point-sooner-you-think.
134. Id.
135. Hotz & Puko, supra note 23.
136. Hahn, supra note 133.
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In sum, climate scientists have concluded that the buildup
of greenhouse gases in the earth’s atmosphere is primarily
caused by man,137 and, in particular, is primarily caused by (1)
man’s burning of fossil fuels, including coal, gasoline, and oil,
which releases CO2; and (2) man’s destruction or dissipation of
many of the natural carbon sinks that exist around the world.138
Again, a “carbon sink” is an area, such as an ocean or a forest,
that absorbs more CO2 than it emits.139
V. SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS REGARDING CLIMATE CHANGE
The first major multilateral agreement regarding climate
change was the U.N. General Assembly’s endorsement of the
establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) by the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO) and the U.N. Environment Program (UNEP).140 The
WMO and the UNEP established the IPCC in 1988, and the U.N.
General Assembly endorsed this joint action in the same year.141
The IPCC is completely apolitical and exists solely to provide the
U.N. members with accurate information regarding the causes
and effects of climate change and suggest methods of adaptation
and mitigation.142 It produces regular reports, referred to as
“Assessments,” but it does not conduct its own research.143
Rather, it synthesizes data and reports produced by scientists
all around the world regarding numerous aspects of climate

137. See, e.g., Causes of Climate Change, supra note 23 (“Humans are
increasingly influencing the climate and the earth’s temperature by burning
fossil fuels, cutting down forests and farming livestock.”).
138. Deforestation and Climate Change, CLIMATE COUNCIL (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://www.climatecouncil.org.au/deforestation/#:~:text=Burning%20fossil%2
0fuels%2C%20in%20combination,carbon%20sinks%20such%20as%20forests.
139. Carbon Sink or Carbon Source? Aerosols Play Significant Role in Shifts,
SCI. DAILY (Dec. 9, 2004), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2004/12
/041208225316.htm.
140. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. INT’L L.
(2008), https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ccc/ccc_e.pdf.
141. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC, https://www.ip
cc.ch/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2020); History of the IPCC, IPCC, https://www.ipcc.
ch/about/history/#:~:text=The%20establishment%20of%20the%20IPCC,UN%2
0General%20Assembly%20in%201988.&text=Since%201988%2C%20the%20I
PCC%20has,about%20climate%20change%20produced%20worldwide
(last
visited Nov. 26, 2020).
142. Id.
143. Id.
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change.144 Although the IPCC is sometimes criticized as not
being alarmist enough,145 the IPCC is considered the most
credible authority on the science of climate change.146 At
present, the IPCC is working on its Sixth Assessment Report,
which will be released in 2022.147
Shortly after the establishment of the IPCC in 1988, the
UNFCCC148 was adopted at U.N. headquarters in New York on
May 9, 1992.149 President George H.W. Bush (Sr.) signed the
UNFCCC on behalf of the U.S. at the Earth Summit held in Rio
De Janeiro in June of 1992,150 and the U.S. Senate then ratified
the UNFCCC on October 15, 1992.151 The UNFCCC entered into
force on March 21, 1994.152 As its name suggests, this
Convention essentially provides a framework through which the
international community can continue to negotiate multilateral
agreements designed to remediate climate change.153 Both the
Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement
were negotiated under the auspices of the UNFCCC.154 This

144. Id.
145. Glenn Scherer, Report: IPCC Underestimates Climate Risks, CLIMATE
CENT. (Dec. 10, 2012), https://www.climatecentral.org/news/report-ipcc-under
estimate-assessing-climate-risks-15338.
146. David Herring, Isn’t There a lot of Disagreement Among Climate
Scientists About Global Warming?, CLIMATE.GOV (Feb. 3, 2020), https://
www.climate.gov/news-features/climate-qa/isnt-there-lot-disagreement-among
-climate-scientists-about-global-warming (“Probably the most definitive
assessments of global climate science come from the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC).”).
147. Sixth Assessment Report, IPCC, https://www.ipcc.ch/assessmentreport/ar6/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2020) [hereinafter Sixth Assessment Report].
148. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted
May 9, 1992, S. TREATY DOC No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into force
Mar. 21, 1994)
149. Status of the Ratification of the Convention, UNFCCC, https://unfccc.in
t/process-and-meetings/the-convention/status-of-ratification/status-of-ratificati
on-of-the-convention (last visited Nov. 26, 2020).
150. Sixth Assessment Report, supra note 148; John Parnell, Countdown to
Rio+20: George Bush Senior Starts 20 Years of Stalemate, CLIMATE HOME NEWS
(Aug. 5, 2012, 4:46 PM), https://www.climatechangenews.com/2012/05/08/count
down-to-rio20-george-bush-senior-starts-20-years-of-stalemate/.
151. Sixth Assessment Report, supra note 147.
152. Id.
153. Climate Get the Big Picture, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/resource/bigpicture/ (last
visited Nov. 26, 2020).
154. Id.; see also Jane Leggett, The United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement: A Summary,
CONG. RSCH. SERV. (JAN. 29, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R46204.pdf.
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Convention remains operational today, and it currently has 197
parties.155
The first agreement negotiated under the UCFCCC was the
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework on Climate
Change (Kyoto Protocol), which was adopted on December 10,
1997, and entered into force in 2005.156 On behalf of the United
States, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Peter Burleigh signed the
Kyoto Protocol on December 11, 1998,157 but because it was
never ratified by the U.S. Senate, the United States was not a
party to the Kyoto Protocol.158 In addition, Canada withdrew
from the Kyoto Protocol on December 12, 2011, stating that the
Protocol’s “goals were unworkable because the United States
and China never agreed to Kyoto . . . ,”159 and the United States
and China were the two largest emitters of greenhouse gases by
2018.160
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the thirty-eight most developed
nations, as well as the European Union (together known as the
Annex 1 Parties) initially made commitments to reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions by 5% below their 1990 levels during
the 2009 to 2012 time period.161 Developing countries (at the
time, including China and India) were encouraged to reduce
their greenhouse gas emissions but were not obligated to do
so.162 Theoretically, the developed nations’ commitments were
legally binding, but if one of these nations failed to meet its
stated greenhouse gas emission commitment, it was granted 100
days to fix or “true up” the situation,163 and it could do so by
acquiring emission reduction credits through three different
market mechanisms or investing in various land use, land use
change, and forestry (LULUCF) projects (essentially designed to
155. Sixth Assessment Report, supra note 147.
156. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, opened for signature 16 Mar. 1998, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 (entered
into force Feb. 16, 2005) [hereinafter U.N. Status Report on the Kyoto Protocol].
157. United States Signs the Kyoto Protocol, U.S. DEP’T STATE ARCHIVE
(Nov. 12, 1998), https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/global_issues/climate/fs-us_
sign_kyoto_981112.html.
158. U.N. Status Report on the Kyoto Protocol, supra note 156.
159. Id.
160. Kyoto Protocol Fast Facts, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/26/world
/kyoto-protocol-fast-facts/index.html (last updated Mar. 18, 2021).
161. Leggett, supra note 154, at 4.
162. Id.
163. Paulina Poplawski-Stephens, What Would Be the Consequences of Not
Meeting Kyoto Carbon Targets?, INST. ENV’T SCI. (Feb. 2014), https://www.theies.org/analysis/what-would-be-consequences-not.
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protect carbon sinks).164 The three market mechanisms are the
Clean Development Mechanism (investing in a carbon emission
reduction project in a developing country),165 Joint
Implementation (entering into an agreement with a group of
parties which, when combined, met their overall commitments),
and Emissions Trading.166 Moreover, if a nation was still noncompliant at the end of that 100-day period, it was simply
required to add its shortfall during the 2009 to 2012 compliance
period to its new commitment for the second compliance Kyoto
Protocol period of 2013 to 2020, plus commit to an additional
30% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions during that second
period.167 Such a noncompliant party furthermore was required
to submit a compliance action plan and its eligibility to make
transfers under Emissions Trading was suspended until it was
once again in compliance with its commitment.168 As the
environmental lawyer for ClientEarth, Josh Roberts, stated
when Canada withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol, the Kyoto
Protocol had “very few teeth beyond international diplomatic
censure.”169
If one assesses the success of the Kyoto Protocol based solely
on whether the remaining thirty-six developed parties (following
the United States’ failure to ratify the Protocol and Canada’s
withdrawal from it) met their greenhouse gas emission
reduction commitments, the Protocol was an unmitigated
success. All thirty-six of these parties met their individual
commitments under the Protocol during the 2009 to 2012
period.170 (Whether these nations met their additional
164. Id.; see also Leggett, supra note 154, at 5.
165. The Clean Development Mechanism, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE
CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-kyoto-protocol/mechanis
ms-under-the-kyoto-protocol/the-clean-development-mechanism (last visited
Dec. 14, 2020) (“Such projects can earn saleable certified emission reduction
(CER) credits, each equivalent to one tonne of [CO2], which can be counted
towards meeting Kyoto targets.”).
166. Leggett, supra note 154, at 5.
167. Poplawski-Stephens, supra note 163; see also An Introduction to the
Kyoto Protocol Compliance Mechanism, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE,
https://unfccc.int/process/the-kyoto-protocol/compliance-under-the-kyotoprotocol/introduction (last visited Dec. 14, 2020) [hereinafter Kyoto Compliance
Mechanism].
168. Kyoto Compliance Mechanism, supra note 167.
169. Canada Condemned at Home and Abroad for Pulling out of Kyoto
Treaty, GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/dec/13/can
ada-condemned-kyoto-climate-treaty (last visited Nov. 10, 2021).
170. See, e.g., Alan Martin, Climate Change: Figures Show Kyoto Protocol
Was a Success – Or Do They?, ALPHR (June 15, 2016), https://www.alphr.com
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greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments with respect to
the 2013 to 2020 period has not yet been assessed.)171 To be sure,
these nations are to be congratulated for having met their initial
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, and their 100%
compliance rate suggests that international peer pressure can be
an effective mode of enforcement.172
Still, if one measures the success of the Kyoto Protocol based
on whether it actually slowed global warming, there is little to
celebrate. To begin with, nine of the thirty-six remaining
developed parties to the Kyoto Protocol actually met their
commitments only by purchasing the right to emit more CO2
from nations that were not emitting as much.173 In addition, the
most severe economic recession since the 1930s occurred during
2008 to 2012, and experts estimate that carbon emissions during
these years were one to two gigatons lower than they otherwise
would have been as a result.174 Most important, most nations in
the world (including the United States and Canada) did not
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions during the 2009 to 2012
period, despite the recession in effect during those years, and
global greenhouse gas emissions, in fact, rose significantly
during those years.175
As indicated above by Canada’s spokesperson at the time
Canada withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol, the major flaw in the
Kyoto Protocol was that it did not require most nations in the
world, including the major greenhouse gas-emitting nations
such as China and India, to make greenhouse gas emission
reduction commitments.176 The continued warming of the earth
simply cannot be halted or slowed until all or at least most
nations on earth significantly reduce their greenhouse

/environment/1003699/climate-change-figures-show-kyoto-protocol-was-asuccess-or-do-they/.
171. Leggett, supra note 154, at 5 (discussing these nations’ progress toward
their contributions as of November 2018).
172. Martin, supra note 170.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions (kt of CO2 Equivalent), THE WORLD
BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.GHGT.KT.CE
(last
visited Dec. 15, 2020).
176. Kyoto Protocol Fast Facts, supra note 160; see also Julian Borger, Bush
Kills Global Warming Treaty, GUARDIAN (Mar. 29, 2001), https://www.theguar
dian.com/environment/2001/mar/29/globalwarming.usnews (“Mr. Bush said he
opposed the Kyoto deal . . . because it exempted developing countries and would
harm the U.S. economy.”).
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emissions.177 In addition, those nations which had been required
under the Protocol to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions
understandably felt that the Protocol unfairly placed the burden
of solving the climate change crisis solely on them.178 While
negotiating a second round of Kyoto Protocol commitments for
the 2013 to 2020 period, Australia, Japan, and a few other
parties proposed the adoption of an agreement that included
commitments on the same terms from all parties to the
Protocol.179 This then led to a mandate, negotiated in 2011 in
Durban, South Africa, to develop a protocol or legal instrument
under the UNFCCC applicable to all participant nations no later
than 2015.180 This mandate resulted in the adoption of the Paris
Agreement.181
The Paris Agreement was the second major agreement
negotiated under the UNFCCC.182 It was adopted at the twentyfirst session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the
UNFCCC, opened for signature on April 22, 2016, and entered
into force on November 4, 2016.183 At present, there are 192
parties to the Paris Agreement,184 constituting almost the entire
193 members of the United Nations.185 The U.S. signed the Paris
Agreement on April 22, 2016, and it accepted the Agreement by
Executive Order on September 3, 2016,186 but former U.S.
President Trump officially withdrew the U.S. from the Paris
Agreement and that withdrawal became effective as of

177. See, e.g., Global Climate Change Regime, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS.
(June 19, 2013), https://www.cfr.org/report/global-climate-change-regime
(“Fifteen to twenty countries are responsible for roughly 75 percent
of global emissions, but no one country accounts for more than about 26
percent. Efforts to cut emissions—mitigation—must therefore be global.”
(emphasis in original)).
178. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 170 (“George W. Bush stated that . . . ‘I’m
not going to let the U.S. carry the burden for cleaning up the world’s air, like
the Kyoto treaty would have done’ . . . .”).
179. Leggett, supra note 154, at 5.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Chapter XXVII Environment: 7.d Paris Agreement (Dec. 12, 2015),
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7d&chapter=27&clang=_en [hereinafter U.N. Status Report on the Paris
Agreement].
184. Id.
185. See About Us, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/about-us (last
visited Jan. 20, 2022) (stating that the U.N. comprises 193 member states).
186. See U.N. Status Report on the Paris Agreement, supra note 183.
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November 4, 2020.187 Then, U.S. President Joe Biden, shortly
after his election, announced that the U.S. was rejoining the
Paris Agreement.188
The overall goal of the Paris Agreement is to “[h]old[] the
increase in the global average temperature to well below 2º
Celsius above pre-industrial levels and pursu[e] efforts to limit
the temperature increase to 1.5º Celsius above pre-industrial
levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks
and impacts of climate change.”189 If the nations of the world do
not make any effort to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions,
the average global temperature is expected to rise between 3°
and 5° Celsius above pre-industrial levels by the end of the
century with catastrophic results.190 A subsidiary goal of the
Paris Agreement is to achieve net zero emissions by mid-century
(2050) by balancing anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions
against removals of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere.191
In order to achieve these goals, each party, prior to
convening in Paris in 2015, was encouraged to publish its
intended individual greenhouse gas emission reduction
contribution or “Intended Nationally Determined Contribution”
(INDC).192 When each party formally joined the Paris Agreement
through ratification or accession, its INDC was treated as its
initial “Nationally Determined Contribution” or NDC, unless it
had altered its INDC prior to its accession to, or ratification of,
the Paris Agreement.193 Each party has furthermore agreed to
communicate a second, more aggressive NDC by 2020 and at
least every five years thereafter.194 Of course, a party may adjust

187. See id. at n.4.
188. Fiona Harvey, US To Hold World Climate Summit Early Next Year and
Seek to Rejoin Paris Accord, GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.theguardi
an.com/environment/2020/dec/14/us-to-hold-world-climate-summit-early-nextyear-and-seek-to-rejoin-paris-accord.
189. Paris Agreement, supra note 30, art. 2.1(a), at 3.
190. Maxime Pontoire, The Race to Zero Emissions, and Why the World
Depends on It, UN NEWS (Dec. 2, 2020), https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/12/1
078612.
191. See Paris Agreement, supra note 30, art. 4.1, at 4.
192. Paris Climate Agreement Q&A, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY
SOLUTIONS, https://www.c2es.org/content/paris-climate-agreement-qa (last
visited Oct. 28, 2021) [hereinafter Paris Climate Agreement Q&A]; Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions, UNFCCC, https://unfccc.int/process-and
-meetings/the-paris-agreement/nationally-determined-contributionsndcs/indcs (last visited Oct. 28, 2021).
193. See Paris Climate Agreement Q&A, supra note 192.
194. Paris Agreement, supra note 30, arts. 4.3, 4.9, at 4–5.
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its existing NDC at any time “with a view to enhancing its level
of ambition.”195 No party is required to commit to any particular
greenhouse gas emission reduction level,196 but every party
agrees to communicate each of its NDCs to the other parties and
allow a panel of experts to review and comment on them.197
Furthermore, the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC is
committed to undertake a “Global Stocktake” in 2023 and every
five years thereafter to assess overall progress toward the Paris
Agreement’s goals.198
All of the NDCs which the parties have submitted to date
are maintained by the Secretariat of the UNFCCC and can be
accessed there.199 For example, in its initial NDC, the EU
(including at that time the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland) committed to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions by at least 40% compared to 1990 by 2030.200 In an
updated NDC submitted on December 17, 2020, the EU
committed to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 55%
compared to 1990 by 2030.201 Furthermore, on December 11,
2020, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland (the UK) submitted a NDC just for the UK, in which it
stipulated that “the UK is committing to reduce economy-wide
greenhouse gas emissions by at least 68% by 2030, compared to

195. Paris Agreement, supra note 30, art. 4.11, at 5.
196. CLIMATE FOCUS, THE PARIS AGREEMENT: SUMMARY 1 (Dec. 28, 2015),
https://www.climatefocus.com/sites/default/files/20151228%20COP%2021%20b
riefing%20FIN.pdf [hereinafter PARIS AGREEMENT SUMMARY].
197. Paris Agreement, supra note 30, arts. 4.2, 4.8, 4.9, 13.7(b), 13.11, at 4–
5, 17–18; see also PARIS AGREEMENT SUMMARY, supra note 196, at 3–4.
198. Paris Agreement, supra note 30, arts. 1, 14.1, 14.2, at 3, 18–19.
199. Id., art. 4.12, at 5. See generally INDCs as Communicated by Parties,
UNFCCC, https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissions/INDC/Submission%20Pa
ges/submissions.aspx (last visited Oct. 28, 2021) (UNFCCC Secretariat’s
registry of parties’ INDC submissions).
200. EUROPEAN COMM’N & LATVIAN PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION, SUBMISSION BY LATVIA AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON
BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES 1 (Mar. 6, 2015),
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Sweden%20Firs
t/EU%20First%20NDC.pdf; see Climate Action: Paris Agreement, EUROPEAN
COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/negotiations/paris_e
n#:~:text=The%20EU’s%20initial%20nationally%20determined,by%20the%
20end%20of%202018 (last visited Oct. 28, 2021) [hereinafter Climate Action:
Paris Agreement].
201. GERMANY & EUROPEAN COMM’N, UPDATE OF THE NDC OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES 6 ¶ 27 (Dec. 17, 2020), https://
www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Sweden%20First/EU_
NDC_Submission_December%202020.pdf.
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1990 levels.”202 This is a significant increase in the commitment
of the UK compared to when it was a member of the EU,203 and
the UK is the seventeenth largest emitter of greenhouse
gases.204 Angola, in its first NDC, stated that it “plans to reduce
GHG emissions up to 35% unconditionally by 2030 as compared
to the Business As Usual (BAU) scenario (base year 2005). In
addition, it is expected that through a conditional mitigation
scenario the country could reduce an additional 15% below BAU
emission levels by 2030.”205 In an updated first NDC submitted
on May 30, 2021, Angola then committed to achieve a 14%
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions (unconditionally) by
2025.206 When the U.S. initially joined the Paris Agreement, its
first NDC provided that “the United States intends to achieve
an economy-wide target of reducing its greenhouse emissions by
26-28 per cent below its 2005 level in 2025 and to make best
efforts to reduce its emissions by 28%.”207 Then, when the U.S.
rejoined the Paris Agreement on February 19, 2021,208 it
submitted an updated first NDC, which stated that it was
“setting an economy-wide target of reducing its net greenhouse
gas emissions by 50-52 percent below 2005 levels in 2030.”209

202. UK GOV’T, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND’S NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTION 1 (2020), https://www4
.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/United%20Kingdom%20of%2
0Great%20Britain%20and%20Northern%20Ireland%20First/UK%20Nationall
y%20Determined%20Contribution.pdf (emphasis omitted).
203. See Climate Action: Paris Agreement, supra note 200.
204. Paul Bolton, UK and Global Emissions and Temperature Trends, UK
PARLIAMENT (June 2, 2021), https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/uk-andglobal-emissions-and-temperature-trends/.
205. REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, INTENDED NATIONALLY DETERMINED
CONTRIBUTION (INDC) OF THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA 4 (Nov. 2015), https://
www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Angola%20First/INDC
%20Angola%20deposito.pdf (emphasis omitted).
206. REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTION OF
ANGOLA 9 (May 2021), https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocu
ments/Angola%20First/NDC%20Angola.pdf.
207. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, U.S. COVER NOTE, INDC AND
ACCOMPANYING INFORMATION 1 (2015), https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstagi
ng/PublishedDocuments/United%20States%20of%20America%20First/U.S.A.
%20First%20NDC%20Submission.pdf.
208. Paris Climate Agreement Q&A, supra note 192.
209. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTION: REDUCING GREENHOUSE GASES IN
THE UNITED STATES: A 2030 EMISSIONS TARGET 1 (2021), https://www4.unfccc
.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/United%20States%20of%20America
%20First/United%20States%20NDC%20April%2021%202021%20Final.pdf
(emphasis omitted).

2022]

CONSERVATION EASEMENTS

207

The Paris Agreement was an extraordinary achievement in
that almost every nation on earth joined the Agreement and
each of those nations committed to reducing its greenhouse gas
emissions.210 Further cause for celebration was the developed
nations’ agreement to continue to fund a “Green Climate Fund”
(GCF) in the amount of at least $100 billion annually by 2020,
to assist the developing and least developed nations to reduce
their own greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate change
(which disproportionately affects these nations).211 In essence,
the developed nations agreed that they owed these funds to the
developing nations as it was the developed nations’ economic
development activities, especially their reliance on fossil fuels,
that was primarily responsible for global warming to date.212
The developing nations, for their part, agreed to use the GCF
“reparation funds” to wean themselves from fossil fuels, follow a
more sustainable economic development model, and adapt to
climate change.213 This funding commitment was critical to
consummation of the Paris Agreement.214 As indicated above,
the establishment of the GCF is an example of the abovementioned Coase theorem in action: once the global community
agreed that the developing nations had a property right to a

210. The Paris Agreement, UNFCCC, https://unfccc.int/process-andmeetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement (last visited Nov. 19, 2021).
211. Climate Finance in the Negotiations, UNFCCC, https://unfccc.int/topic
s/climate-finance/the-big-picture/climate-finance-in-the-negotiations
(last
visited Oct. 29, 2021); Resource Mobilization, GREEN CLIMATE FUND, https://ww
w.greenclimate.fund/about/resource-mobilisation# (last visited Oct. 29, 2021);
see Paris Agreement, supra note 30, art. 9, at 13–14.
212. Climate Funds Update, CLIMATE FUNDS UPDATE, https://
climatefundsupdate.org/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2021); see also The $3 Billion U.S.
Pledge for the Green Climate Fund: Is It a Lot?, BROOKINGS (Nov. 17, 2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2014/11/17/the-3-billion-u-s-pledg
e-for-the-green-climate-fund-is-it-a-lot/ (breaking down the financial
contributions).
213. About GCF, GREEN CLIMATE FUND, https://www.greenclimate.fund/ab
out (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
214. See DELIVERING ON THE $100 BILLION CLIMATE FINANCE COMMITMENT
AND TRANSFORMING CLIMATE FINANCE, INDEP. EXPERT GRP. ON CLIMATE FIN.
6 (Dec. 2020), https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/100_billion_climate
_finance_report.pdf; see also Tucker Davey, Developing Countries Can’t Afford
Climate Change, FUTURE LIFE INST. (Aug. 5, 2016), https://futureoflife
.org/2016/08/05/developing-countries-cant-afford-climate-change/;
Benoit
Mayer, Climate Change Reparations and the Law and Practice of State
Responsibility, 7 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 185, 187, 194–95 (2016), https://www.cambri
dge.org/core/journals/asian-journal-of-international-law/article/climate-change
-reparations-and-the-law-and-practice-of-state-responsibility/59BEEB3F2AE3
9E8A2DA15815B25D3270.
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clean atmosphere and that furthermore the developed nations
had violated that right, the parties could negotiate a payment
from the developed nations to the developing nations to rectify
this property right violation.215
The Paris Agreement is a groundbreaking agreement that
has the potential to solve the global warming crisis,216 and
arguably it is premature to assess the success of the Paris
Agreement as the UNFCCC won’t complete its first “Global
Stocktake” of greenhouse gas emissions until 2023.217 However,
climate scientists have warned that aggregation of all of the
parties’ initial NDC ambitions would need to be tripled to
prevent the average global temperature from exceeding 2°
Celsius above the pre-industrial average global temperature and
would need to be increased fivefold to prevent the average global
temperature from exceeding 1.5° Celsius.218 In other words, the
average global temperature is predicted to rise between 2.9°
Celsius and 3.4° Celsius above the pre-industrial average global
temperature even if all of the Paris Agreement parties meet
their stated NDCs.219 In addition, numerous authorities have
reported that the great majority of Paris Agreement parties are

215. Pindyck, supra note 108, at 345.
216. Katie Regan, 195 Nations Reach Groundbreaking Climate Change
Agreement, NACCHO (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.naccho.org/blog/articles/195nations-reach-groundbreaking-climate-change-agreement.
217. Global Stocktake, UNFCCC, https://unfccc.int/topics/science/workstrea
ms/global-stocktake#eq-1 (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
218. Joeri Rogelj et al., The Emissions Gap, in UNITED NATIONS ENV’T
PROGRAMME, EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2020, at 25, 28 (2020), https://www.unep
.org/emissions-gap-report-2020; see also Stephen Leahy, Most Countries Aren’t
Hitting 2030 Climate Goals, and Everyone Will Pay the Price, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/articl
e/nations-miss-paris-targets-climate-driven-weather-events-cost-billions
(referring to a study conducted by climate scientists entitled “The Truth Behind
the Paris Agreement Climate Pledges” and stating, in part, that “[c]ountries
need to double and triple their 2030 reduction commitments to be aligned with
the Paris target”).
219. National Climate Action Under the Paris Agreement, WORLD
RESOURCES INST., https://www.wri.org/ndcs (last visited Oct. 29, 2021)
[hereinafter National Climate Action]; see also Shyam Saran, Paris Climate
Talks: Developed Countries Must Do More Than Reduce Emissions, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/nov/23/parisclimate-talks-developed-countries-must-do-more-than-reduce-emissions;
Warren Cornwall, The Paris Climate Pact Is 5 Years Old. Is It Working?,
SCIENCE (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/12/paris-clim
ate-pact-5-years-old-it-working.
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failing to meet even their very modest NDCs.220 In short, the
Paris Agreement is doomed to fail unless the parties, especially
the biggest greenhouse gas emitters, establish and adhere to
much more aggressive NDCs within just the next few years.221
Specifically, according to climate scientists, the parties must
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by at least 45% as
compared to 2010 emission levels by 2030, less than eight short
years from now, if they want to have a realistic chance of meeting
the temperature goals stated in the Paris Agreement.222
Unfortunately, as of late October 2021, only thirteen parties
to the Paris Agreement had submitted their second NDC, which
was due in 2020.223 These countries are Argentina, Bhutan,
Gambia, Grenada, Marshall Islands, Nepal, Oman, Papua New
Guinea, Samoa, South Sudan, Suriname, Tonga, and United

220. See, e.g., Leahy, supra note 218; Nsikan Akpan, Only 2 Countries Are
Meeting Their Climate Pledges. Here’s How the 10 Worst Could Improve, PBS
(Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/only-2-countries-aremeeting-their-climate-pledges-heres-how-the-10-worst-could-improve.
Furthermore, experts predict that the average global temperature will rise
more than 4° Celsius above the pre-industrial average global temperature if
nations ignore their Paris Agreement commitments and continue to increase
their greenhouse gas emissions. See National Climate Action, supra note 219;
Carmen Singer et al., The 7 Countries Actually Living Up to the Paris Climate
Agreement, GLOBAL CITIZEN (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.globalcitizen.org
/en/content/7-countries-paris-climate-agreeement/.
221. See David Roberts, The Paris Climate Agreement is at Risk of Falling
Apart in the 2020s, VOX (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.vox.com/energy-andenvironment/2019/11/5/20947289/paris-climate-agreement-2020s-breakdowntrump; Fiona Harvey, World Is in Danger of Missing Paris Climate Target,
Summit Is Warned, GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com
/environment/2020/dec/12/world-is-in-danger-of-missing-paris-climate-targetsummit-is-warned.
222. Myles Allen et al., Summary for Policymakers, in GLOBAL WARMING OF
1.5°C. AN IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON THE IMPACTS OF GLOBAL WARMING OF
1.5°C ABOVE PRE-INDUSTRIAL LEVELS AND RELATED GLOBAL GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSION PATHWAYS, IN THE CONTEXT OF STRENGTHENING THE GLOBAL
RESPONSE TO THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,
AND
EFFORTS
TO
ERADICATE
POVERTY
3,
12
(Valerie
Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., 2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/site
s/2/2019/05/SR15_SPM_version_report_LR.pdf; see “Climate Commitments Not
on Track to Meet Paris Agreement Goals” as NDC Synthesis Report Is Published,
UNFCCC (Feb. 26, 2021), https://unfccc.int/news/climate-commitments-not-ontrack-to-meet-paris-agreement-goals-as-ndc-synthesis-report-is-published;
Akpan, supra note 220.
223. NDC Registry, UNFCCC, https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging
/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited Oct. 29, 2021) (“13 Parties have submitted their
second NDCs.”).
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Arab Emirates,224 and none of the thirteen is in the group of the
top ten emitters of carbon dioxide (based on 2018 data).225 Not
surprisingly, greenhouse gas emissions have continued to
increase, rather than decrease, since the 2015 adoption of the
Paris Agreement.226
To be sure, the U.S.’ rejoining of the Paris Agreement in
2021227 as well as the distribution of vaccines throughout the
world to protect against the COVID-19 pandemic228 are likely to
reenergize the Paris Agreement parties and cause them to focus
more on their commitments to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.229 In addition, the twenty-sixth Conference of Parties
(COP) of the UNFCCC, which was rescheduled from November
2020 to November 2021 because of the COVID-19 crisis,230

224. NDC Registry (Interim), UNFCCC, https://www4.unfccc.int/sites
/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx (last visited Oct. 29, 2021) (listing all parties’ first
and, where applicable, second NDCs).
225. See Robert Rapier, The World’s Top 10 Carbon Dioxide Emitters,
FORBES (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2019/12/04/theworlds-top-10-carbon-dioxide-emitters/?sh=532d045d2d04; Each Country’s
Share of CO2 Emissions, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://www.ucsu
sa.org/resources/each-countrys-share-co2-emissions (last updated Aug, 12,
2020).
226. Rebecca Lindsey, Climate Change: Annual Greenhouse Gas Index,
CLIMATE.GOV (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understa
nding-climate/climate-change-annual-greenhouse-gas-index.
227. Press Statement, U.S. Sec’y of State Antony J. Blinken, The United
States Officially Rejoins the Paris Agreement (Feb. 19, 2021), https://www.state
.gov/the-united-states-officially-rejoins-the-paris-agreement.
228. See Josh Holder, Tracking Coronavirus Vaccinations Around the World,
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/world/covid-vaccination
s-tracker.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2021); see also António Guterres, U.N. Sec’yGen., Remarks to the Nordic Council (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.un.org/sg/en
/content/sg/speeches/2020-10-27/remarks-the-nordic-council (stating that “the
world is way off track” in its efforts to combat climate change and develop the
world’s economies in a sustainable manner, on account of the COVID-19
pandemic).
229. See Schroders Climate Progress Dashboard: Despite COP26 Delay
Biden Election Win May Reenergise Global Climate Change Action, SCHRODERS
(Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.schroders.com/en/media-relations/newsroom/all_n
ews_releases/schroders-climate-progress-dashboard-despite-cop26-delay-biden
-election-win-may-reenergise-global-climate-change-action/
(stating
that
President Biden’s election and the U.S. rejoining the Paris Agreement could
reenergize Paris Agreement parties’ commitments); Justin Rowlatt, Why 2021
Could Be Turning Point for Tackling Climate Change, BBC (Jan. 1, 2021),
https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-55498657 (stating that, by the
end of 2021, the COVID-19 vaccines should kick in and the world can turn its
attention to solving the climate change crisis).
230. Press Release, UNFCCC, COP26 Postponed (Apr. 1, 2020),
https://unfccc.int/news/cop26-postponed [hereinafter COP26 Postponed];
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should encourage the parties to negotiate much more aggressive
second NDCs.231 Still, if global warming was a crisis in 2015, it
is an impending catastrophe today.
Bold, innovative approaches must be employed by the Paris
Agreement parties to assist them to reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions. The remainder of this paper proposes one such
approach.
VI. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE IRC
This short section describes the specific amendments to
Section 170232 of the IRC that I propose the U.S. Congress adopt.
As indicated above, I recommend that Section 170 of the IRC be
amended to permit an owner of fossil fuels to take a credit on the
owner’s federal tax return for the entire value of his or her
current fossil fuel operation, in the event that the owner grants
a conservation easement prohibiting any further extraction,
refinement, sale or distribution of those fuels.233 At present, the
IRC does not even permit an owner of fossil fuels to take a
deduction on the owner’s federal tax return for the value of his
or her fossil fuel operation, should the owner grant such a
conservation easement.234 I am proposing that a fossil fuel owner
Glasgow Climate Change Conference – October-November 2021, UNFCCC,
https://unfccc.int/conference/glasgow-climate-change-conference-octobernovember-2021 (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
231. See COP26 Postponed, supra note 230; John F. Kerry, U.S. Special
Presidential Envoy for Climate, Transcript of Remarks to UNA-USA’s Global
Engagement Summit, Marking the United States Rejoining the Paris Agreement
- With Q&A (Feb. 19, 2021), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement
/2021-02-19/transcript-of-remarks-una-usa%E2%80%99s-global-engagementsummit-marking-the-united-states-rejoining-the-paris-agreement-qa (stating
that, at the COP26 in Glasgow in November 2021, “all nations must raise our
sights, must raise ambition together”).
232. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 170.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 82–87.
234. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(i)–(iv). Earth scientists at Stanford University
and environmental law professors at the University of Buffalo and University
of California at Los Angeles have advocated for fossil fuel owners to grant
conservation easements prohibiting fracking (otherwise known as hydraulic
fracturing) and other subsurface activities on their land and they have dubbed
such conservation easements “mineral estate conservation easements”
(MECEs). Robert B. Jackson et al., Mineral Estate Conservation Easements: A
New Policy Instrument to Address Hydraulic Fracturing and Resource
Extraction, 47 ENV’T L. REP. 10112, 10113–15 (2017). They furthermore have
proposed that the IRC (and state income tax laws, if necessary) be amended to
recognize a MECE as a conservation easement. Id. at 10119–20; see also Devon
Ryan, New Analysis Suggests Ways for Landowners to Limit Fracking
and Mineral Extraction Without Regulations, STANFORD U. NEWS (Feb. 1, 201
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who grants such a conservation easement be entitled to take a
credit, rather than a deduction,235 because the economic analysis
below demonstrates that paying fossil fuel owners for the full
value of their operations is economically efficient,236 most fossil
fuel owners probably would not grant such a conservation
easement simply for a deduction of the value of their operation
on their federal tax return, and society desperately needs these
owners to close their operations.
As Subsection “a” of Section 170 of the IRC is entitled
“Allowance of Deduction,” it most likely would be easiest for the
U.S. Congress to amend Section 170 as advocated here by adding
a new subsection “r” to Section 170 of the IRC entitled
“Allowance of Credit.” As in the case of a conservation easement
generally, the value of any fossil fuel owner’s operation should
be valued at the time that the deed of easement is recorded and
all relevant information should be considered in the
determination of that value.237 Although such conservation
easements would be voluntary, it would behoove any fossil fuel
owner to grant such an easement sooner rather than later, as
the value of any owner’s operation can be expected to decline in
the future.238 As the value of some such operations could be very
high, the U.S. Congress could provide that the credit is limited
7), https://news.stanford.edu/2017/02/01/Stanford-analysis-suggests-ways-land
owners-limit-fracking-mineral-extraction-without-regulations/
(discussing
MECEs and the approach advocated by Professors Jackson, Owley, and
Salzman).
235. Several states already permit a taxpayer to take a credit, rather than a
deduction, on the taxpayer’s state income tax return for the value of an
approved conservation easement, although many such states impose an upper
limit on the credit that can be claimed. See Land Trust Alliance, State Tax
Credits for Donation of a Conservation Easement, LAND CONSERVATION
ASSISTANCE NETWORK, https://www.landcan.org/article/state-tax-credits-fordonation-of-a-conservation-easement/1616 (last visited Oct. 29, 2021)
(discussing various state tax code provisions that permit a taxpayer to take a
credit for donation of a conservation easement).
236. See infra text accompanying notes 350–406.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 66–71.
238. Value may be adversely impacted and thus expected to decline due to
the organized movement to divest in fossil fuels. See, e.g., Fossil Fuel
Divestment: A $5 Trillion Challenge, BLOOMBERGNEF (BNEF) (Aug. 26, 2014),
https://about.bnef.com/blog/fossil-fuel-divestment-5-trillion-challenge/;
Joe
Ryan, Fossil Fuel Industry Risks Losing $33 Trillion to Climate Change,
BLOOMBERG (July 11, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201607-11/fossil-fuel-industry-risks-losing-33-trillion-to-climate-change;
Akshat
Rathi, Bill Gates Shows How Hard It Can Be to Divest From Fossil Fuel,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 15, 2021), https://www.bloombergquint.com/wealth/billgates-in-new-climate-book-talks-about-finally-divesting-from-oil.
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to a stated amount on the owner’s tax return for any particular
year but could be carried over on future tax returns for a stated
number of years until the full credit has been claimed. Section
170 of the IRC already establishes such yearly limits for
conservation easement deductions and provides in general for
the value of a conservation easement to be carried over on future
tax returns for up to fifteen years.239
The U.S. Congress in this new subsection of Section 170 of
the IRC should provide that any such credit is conditioned on the
taxpayer’s agreement that any further federal or state subsidies
promoting the use of the taxpayer’s fossil fuels will cease. To be
sure, a fossil fuel owner’s use of state or federal subsidies to
exploit the owner’s fuels would violate the terms of such a
conservation easement in any case. However, to avoid confusion
on this point, it would be best to explicitly state that a fossil fuel
owner that grants such a conservation easement and claims the
credit proposed here forfeits the right to receive any further state
or federal subsidies intended to promote the exploitation of the
taxpayer’s fossil fuels.
Furthermore, the amendment to Section 170 of the IRC
should include a rigorous program of monitoring and
enforcement by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) together
with the owners of such conservation easements (the land trust
or government agency receiving the easement in each case). The
new conservation easements proposed in this article cannot
assist in the critically important goal of slowing global warming
if the easements are not enforced. To date, violations of a
conservation easement by the landowner that granted the
easement have been rare, but they do occur.240 In addition, a
conservation easement owner (again, the land trust or
government agency entrusted to enforce the easement)
occasionally has knowingly permitted the conservation
easement to be violated.241 Given the fossil fuel industry’s

239. See supra text accompanying notes 73–81.
240. See, e.g., Ann Harris Smith, Conservation Easement Violated: What
Next? A Discussion of Remedies, 20 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 597, 598 (2017)
(citing J. Breting Engel, The Development, Status, and Viability of the
Conservation Easement as a Private Land Conservation Tool in the Western
United States, 39 URB. L. 19, 35 (2007)).
241. E.g., Randy Schultz, Water District Gets Tough on All the Wrong People,
S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/opinion/flrsscol-water-district-20161213-story.html (explaining that although sale of
acreage in Palm Beach Agricultural Preserve to GL Homes initially would be
subject to a conservation easement restricting it to agricultural use, a majority
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tremendous political power today,242 it is not difficult to imagine
a situation in which a fossil fuel owner grants a conservation
easement agreeing not to extract, refine, sell, or distribute the
owner’s fossil fuels, receives a full credit for the value of the
owner’s fossil fuel operation on the owner’s federal tax return,
and then somehow continues to exploit those fossil fuels.
If a violation of such a conservation easement is established,
the IRS, of course, could obtain back taxes243 and possibly
penalties244 from the fossil fuel owner/taxpayer. In addition,
judges in at least some state courts possess the power to issue
injunctive relief and award damages for breach of a conservation
easement.245 The final recommended amendment to Section 170
of the IRC is that it include a requirement that a fossil fuel
owner must agree, in the easement agreement, that a proper
remedy for the owner’s violation of the easement would be to
transfer ownership of the owner’s fossil fuels to the easement
owner or another appropriate entity if that easement owner no
longer exists, was complicit in the easement violation, or does
not possess the capacity to ensure that the fossil fuels will not be
extracted, refined, sold, or distributed in the future. As
indicated, the fossil fuels should be subject to the same
restrictions in the hands of the transferee.246 In light of society’s
desperate need for such conservation easements and taxpayers’
very generous payment to fossil fuel owners of the full value of
their operations pursuant to the amended IRC Section 170
discussed here, the remedies for violations of such easements
need to be severe enough to ensure that the great majority of
vote of the seven-member Palm Beach County Commission could grant a landuse change that would permit GL Homes to build homes on the land); see Wells
Dusenbury, Timeline: As Thousands of New Homes Rise, Farmland Vanishes in
Palm Beach Country, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL (June 1, 2021), https://
www.sun-sentinel.com/local/palm-beach/fl-ne-pbc-ag-reservedevelopment-2021
0601-4k5ydquvczeerdetpkrtqtko3e-story.html (discussing sales by Palm Beach
County and the Lake Worth Drainage District of numerous acres to GL Homes
for construction of thousands of homes on land that had been given the abovementioned land-use change).
242. See infra text accompanying note 287.
243. Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide, supra note 67.
244. Id.
245. Smith, supra note 240, at 605–07.
246. Related state legislation may need to be enacted to ensure that civil
judges possess the power to transfer title of the fossil fuels in question to the
easement owner or other appropriate entity as a remedy for a fossil fuel owner’s
violation of the easement terms and provide for third-party enforcement of such
a conservation easement when the easement owner is not enforcing the
easement. Such legislation, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
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fossil fuel owners granting such easements will comply with the
terms of their easements.
The next section demonstrates that it would be economically
efficient for the U.S. to pay fossil fuel owners the full value of
their operations in exchange for their agreement to cease
extracting, refining, selling, and distributing their fuels.
VII.

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

A. IT APPEARS THAT THE MOST ECONOMICALLY EFFICIENT
METHOD OF SLOWING GLOBAL WARMING IS TO LEAVE FOSSIL
FUELS IN THE GROUND.
As stated above, Garrett Hardin, the author of The Tragedy
of the Commons, concluded that, in order to save a commonlyowned natural resource such as the world’s atmosphere, a
government must either embrace “mutual coercion, mutually
agreed upon” or employ “private property, or something formally
like it.”247 If a government could impose “mutual coercion,
mutually agreed upon,” it should order that fossil fuels stay in
the ground, as that can be the most economically efficient
method of slowing climate change.248 This conclusion is based, at
least in part, on the common-sense notion that “prevention is
better than the cure.” In other words, if a society pays to keep
fossil fuels in the ground and therefore no carbon dioxide is
emitted in the first place, it does not need to pay the much higher
costs of remedying local air pollution and slowing global
warming that are imposed by the burning of fossil fuels. The
adage “prevention is better than the cure” is generally
attributable to the Dutch philosopher Desiderius Erasmus in
approximately 1500249 and is applicable in many contexts.250 For
247. Hardin, supra note 101, at 1245, 1247.
248. Bård Harstad, Buy Coal! A Case for Supply-Side Environmental Policy,
120 J. POL’Y ECON. 77, 79, 106 (2012) [hereinafter Harstad 2012]; see also Bård
Harstad, Pay Countries to Keep Their Fossil Fuels in the Ground, FIN. TIMES
(July 4, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/f9496782-e491-11e2-875b-00144feab
dc0 [hereinafter Harstad, Financial Times] (summarizing the main points of the
above paper).
249. See Prevention Is Better Than Cure, ROYAL COLL. NURSING,
https://www.rcn.org.uk/get-involved/campaign-with-us/prevention-is-betterthan-cure (last visited Oct. 21, 2021).
250. See, e.g., Leszek Borysiewicz, Prevention Is Better Than Cure, 9
CLINICAL MED. 572 (2009) (preventing acquisition of an illness through
vaccination); Amer Ridzuan, Prevention is Better Than Cure (MUET ESSAY),
AMERZING (Aug. 4, 2017), https://ameridzuan.blogspot.com/2017/08/preventionis-better-than-cure-muet.html (healthy living to prevent illness, safe driving to
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example, one of the main rationales for implementation of a
national health care system is that generally it is much less
expensive to ensure that an individual does not contract a
particular illness in the first place than it is to treat that person
in the emergency room of a hospital or cure the person of that
illness.251
However, today neither the Paris Agreement coalition of
parties nor the U.S. as an individual country is able to impose
“mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon” to slow global
warming.252 In the U.S., states and local governments possess
the primary authority to regulate land use,253 and there are
states (e.g., California) that have implemented various
innovative and aggressive measures to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions254 and conceivably could ban the exploration and
extraction of fossil fuels within their territories. Unfortunately,
other states that possess large stores of fossil fuels appear to
have very little interest in reducing their production of fossil
fuels and would be very unlikely to prohibit the exploration and
extraction of fossil fuels in their territories within the next
several years.255 The U.S. Congress, pursuant to the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution,256 and primarily through the
Environmental Protection Agency which Congress endorsed,257
can and does regulate carbon dioxide emissions throughout the
prevent automobile accidents, and financial planning and vigilance to avoid
financial fraud and bankruptcy).
251. See Kimberly Amadeo, How Preventive Care Lowers Health Care Costs:
National Health Care Plans Must Cover Preventive Care, BALANCE (Jan. 28,
2021), https://www.thebalance.com/preventive-care-how-it-lowers-aca-costs-33
06074.
252. See Melissa Denchak, Paris Climate Agreement: Everything You Need
to Know, NRDC (Feb. 19, 2021), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/paris-climateagreement-everything-you-need-know (pointing out that emissions reductions
targets and financial contributions goals have no enforcement mechanisms to
compel countries to comply with the targets).
253. Lake Cty. Estates v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 402
(1979).
254. See, e.g., Climate Change, CAL. AIR RES. BD., https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our
-work/topics/climate-change (last visited Oct. 29, 2021) (detailing the work of
the California Air Resources Board in response to climate change).
255. See Major Fossil Fuel-Producing States Rely Heavily on Severance
Taxes, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.eia.gov
/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=22612 (showing that states producing fossil fuels
rely disproportionately on severance taxes on extracted resources, meaning the
states financially benefit from increased extraction).
256. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
257. The Origins of EPA, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/history
/origins-epa (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
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U.S.258 Still, given the fifty-fifty split between Democrats and
Republicans in the U.S. Senate today, there is very little chance
that the current U.S. Congress would be able to ban the
extraction, refinement, sale, and distribution of fossil fuels
throughout the U.S.259
Furthermore, just like U.S. states that possess large
reserves of fossil fuels tend to promote rather than restrict
production of their fossil fuels, none of the Paris Agreement
parties that possess large fossil fuel reserves (e.g., Saudi Arabia,
India, Venezuela, the Russian Federation, Indonesia, Australia,
and Nigeria) made a significant commitment to restrict its
supply of fossil fuels in its initial NDC.260 For example, India is
the only nation in the top ten fossil fuel producers that
mentioned restraining the supply of fossil fuels at all261 (and that
restraint consists solely of a coal tax).262 Also, there simply is no
international legislature that could prohibit the extraction,
refinement, sale, and distribution of fossil fuels around the
world.263 In addition, China and the Russian Federation almost

258. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 416 (2011) (“[T]his
Court held that the Clean Air Act authorizes federal regulation of emissions of
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases.” (internal citation omitted) (citing
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–30 (2007))); Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 282 (1981) (holding that “the power
conferred by the Commerce Clause [is] broad enough to permit congressional
regulation of activities causing air or water pollution, or other environmental
hazards that may have effects in more than one State.”). See generally Robinson
Meyer, How the U.S. Protects the Environment, From Nixon to Trump,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/03
/how-the-epa-and-us-environmental-law-works-a-civics-guide-pruitt-trump/52
1001/ (“Every major post-1970 environment law relies on this Constitutional
power—the Commerce Clause in Article I, Section 8—to restrict air and water
pollution and protect endangered species.”).
259. See Coral Davenport, This Powerful Democrat Linked to Fossil Fuels
Will Craft the U.S. Climate Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2021), https://www.nyti
mes.com/2021/09/19/climate/manchin-climate-biden.html
(discussing
how
Senator Joe Manchin, a West Virginia Democrat with deep ties to coal and
natural gas interests, will be the key swing vote on climate legislation and thus
sweeping reductions in extraction are extremely unlikely with the current
composition of the Senate).
260. See, e.g., Georgia Piggot et al., Addressing Fossil Fuel Production Under
the UNFCCC: Paris and Beyond 10–11 (Stockholm Env’t Inst., Working Paper
No. 2017-09, 2017).
261. Id. at 11–12, Tbl. 1.
262. Id. at 11.
263. See N.N. Singh, The Absence of a Sovereign Legislature and Its
Consequences for International Law, 12 MALAYA L. REV. 277, 277 (1970);
Stephen M. Schwebel, The Effect of Resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly
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certainly would veto any U.N. Security Council action
interfering in the affairs of individual nations to slow global
warming, including a worldwide ban on the extraction,
refinement, sale, and distribution of fossil fuels, unless
numerous imminent deaths were threatened in both China and
the Russian Federation.264
Accordingly, per Hardin’s conclusion, both the Paris
Agreement coalition and the U.S. must employ “private
property” concepts, or, in other words, private market
mechanisms, to slow global warming.265 In this context,
“[m]arket-based environmental policies work by creating an
incentive to reduce or eliminate emissions,”266 primarily by
affecting the demand or supply (and therefore the price) of a
particular fossil fuel or alternative energy source.267 Figure 1
below demonstrates how price and demand for gasoline are
inversely related.268 In other words, it shows that, “as [the] price
of [gasoline] rises, quantity demanded decreases, and vice versa.
These points are then graphed, and the line connecting them is
the demand curve (D).”269 The provision of subsidies for the
production or use of alternative energy forms, the imposition of
a carbon tax, the implementation of a cap-and-trade program
(which serves the same function as a carbon tax), and
conservation easements preserving carbon sinks and prohibiting
on Customary International Law, 73 PROC. ANN. MEETING (AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.)
301, 301 (1979).
264. See Ed King, China and Russia Block UN Security Council Climate
Change Action, CLIMATE HOME NEWS (Feb. 18, 2013), https://www.climate
changenews.com/2013/02/18/china-and-russia-block-un-security-councilclimate-change-action/ (showing that China and Russia have used their seats
on the UN Security Council to block climate action in the past and will likely do
so again).
265. See Hardin, supra note 101, at 1245, 1247.
266. Janet Peace & Jason Ye, Market Mechanisms: Options for Climate
Policy, CTR. FOR CLIMATE ENERGY SOLS., at 1, 2 (Apr. 2020).
267. See JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR & LARRY PARKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40242, CARBON TAX AND GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL: OPTIONS AND
CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS 44 (2009) (stating that both a carbon tax and
a cap-and-trade program are intended “to increase the price of fossil fuels”);
U.N. Env’t Programme, Reforming Energy Subsidies: Opportunities to
Contribute to the Climate Change Agenda (2008), https://wedocs.unep.org
/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/7754/-Reforming%20Energy%20Subsidies-200
2150.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y.
268. See Reading: Demand, Supply, and Equilibrium in Markets for Goods
and Services, LUMEN LEARNING, https://courses.lumenlearning.com/baycollegeintrobusiness/chapter/reading-demand-supply-and-equilibrium-in-marketsfor-goods-and-services/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
269. Id.
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the extraction of fossil fuels are all examples of such private
market measures.270

FIGURE 1: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DEMAND AND
PRICE OF OIL271

However, in any coalition of governments where some have
committed to reducing CO2 emissions and some have not, if an
individual government reduces its consumption of fossil fuels
(i.e., pursues demand-side policies), the coalition price of fossil
fuels will decline and those members of the coalition that have
not committed to reduce CO2 emissions will simply consume
more fossil fuels.272 In economics terminology, this is known as

270. See, e.g., RAMSEUR & PARKER, supra note 267, at 2 (comparing the
market mechanisms of a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade program); NAT’L ACAD.
OF ENG’G ET AL., THE POWER OF RENEWABLES: OPPORTUNITIES AND
CHALLENGES FOR CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 8 (2010) (“The most
prominent national policy approach for renewable energy in both China and the
United States has been price support, both direct and indirect. U.S. subsidies
have been primarily in the form of tax breaks for producers and consumers, and
have been effective in driving specific market and technology development.”).
271. Reading: Demand, Supply, and Equilibrium in Markets for Goods and
Services, LUMEN LEARNING, https://courses.lumenlearning.com/baycollegeintrobusiness/chapter/reading-demand-supply-and-equilibrium-in-marketsfor-goods-and-services/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
272. Harstad 2012, supra note 248, at 78.
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“carbon leakage,”273 and Figure 2 below demonstrates this
phenomenon.274
Alternatively, if an individual government in such a
coalition reduces its supply of fossil fuels (i.e., pursues supplyside policies), the coalition price will increase and fossil fuel
producers that have not committed to reduce CO2 emissions will
simply produce more fossil fuels.275 This is known as “supplyside leakage,”276 and Figure 3 below demonstrates this
phenomenon.277

FIGURE 2: DEMAND-SIDE LEAKAGE278

273. Id. (citing the IPCC’s definition of carbon leakage as “the increase in
CO2 emissions outside the countries taking domestic mitigation action divided
by the reduction in the emissions of these countries”).
274. See Bård Harstad, Buy Coal! A Case for Supply-Side Environment
Policies, at 7, https://www.eaere.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/PRESENTAT
ION-Erik-Kempe-Award-2013.pdf [hereinafter Harstad Presentation] (last
visited Oct. 29, 2021) (slide deck presentation by Harstad).
275. Harstad 2012, supra note 248, at 78–79.
276. See id.
277. Harstad Presentation, supra note 274, at 8.
278. Id. at 7 (figure has a few adjustments approved by Harstad).
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FIGURE 3: SUPPLY-SIDE LEAKAGE279

Therefore, both the Paris Agreement coalition and the U.S.
should, at a minimum, pursue both demand-side policies and
supply-side policies to balance demand-side leakage and supplyside leakage.280 Furthermore, they should do whatever they can
to keep fossil fuels in the ground, as doing so can be the most
economically efficient strategy for slowing global warming.281
Unfortunately, most climate change agreements among
nations, including the Paris Agreement, and most individual
governments promote demand-side climate policies.282 In other
words, they generally encourage imposing limits on greenhouse
gas emissions (e.g., through a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade
program) rather than imposing limits on greenhouse gas
production.283 As saturation of the atmosphere with CO2 is the
ultimate cause of global warming, national policymakers
logically may conclude that fossil fuel consumption is the

279. Id. at 8.
280. See G.B. Asheim et al., The Case for a Supply-Side Climate Treaty: The
Paris Agreement can be Strengthened by a Treaty Limiting Global Fossil Fuel
Supply, 365 SCIENCE 325, 325 (2019).
281. See Harstad 2012, supra note 248, at 77, 79, 106.
282. See Michael Lazarus et al., Supply-Side Climate Policy: The Road Less
Taken 3, 7 (Stockholm Env’t Inst., Working Paper No. 2015-13, 2015), https://m
ediamanager.sei.org/documents/Publications/Climate/SEI-WP-2015-13-Supply
-side-climate-policy.pdf (discussing the prevalence of demand-side climate
policies and the opportunities to implement supply-side policies to complement
or substitute the current policies in place).
283. See Harstad 2012, supra note 248, at 77–79 (discussing the prevalence
of demand-side climate policies and the issues that arise from them).
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“problem” that needs to be attacked.284 In addition, lawmakers
may find it much more difficult to adopt supply-side policies and
directly attack a few fossil fuel producers than to adopt demandside policies and ask the much larger group of consumers to
reduce their consumption of fossil fuels.285 This is especially the
case, given that many governments rely on fossil fuel profits as
an important component of their own coffers286 and fossil fuel
producers tend to be very powerful politically.287 This does not
bode well for the battle against global warming.288
Again, the Paris Agreement is a tremendous success in that
it includes almost the entire community of nations in one, allencompassing climate change agreement.289 Also, as mentioned
above, the Paris Agreement arguably is an example of Coase’s

284. See Lazarus et al., supra note 282, at 3 (stating that the “combustion of
fossil fuels is by far the largest human source of global greenhouse gas
emissions” and laying out some of the ways that policymakers are attempting
to lessen the amount of fossil fuel consumption).
285. Id. at 4, 7 (stating that supply-side climate policies are less common for
three general reasons: “1) the greater political attractiveness of demand as
compared with supply measures; 2) standard GHG accounting rules that
undervalue supply-side relative to demand-side measures; and 3) common
perceptions of the nature of fuel markets,” and discussing how supply-side
policies “target a narrower set of actors”).
286. See, e.g., ADELE C. MORRIS, THE CHALLENGE OF STATE RELIANCE ON
REVENUE FROM FOSSIL FUEL PRODUCTION 2 (2016), https://www.brookings.edu
/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/state-fiscal-implications-of-fossil-fuel-production0809216-morris.pdf (analyzing U.S. states’ reliance on fossil fuels to generate
state revenue); James Landale, What Will the End of Oil Dependence Mean for
Geopolitics?, BBC (Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-50974609
(“Russia is one of the biggest exporters of oil and gas in the world. Its economy
and its government depend hugely on the revenues this brings in. Little wonder
that President Putin describes the development of ‘green technologies’
as . . . one of the ‘main challenges and threats’ to Russia’s economic security.”
(emphasis omitted)); James Cust et al., Unburnable Wealth of Nations:
Successful Action to Address Climate Change Would Diminish the Value of
Fossil Fuel Resources in Many of the World’s Poorest Countries, 54 FIN. & DEV.
46 (2017) (explaining how it is difficult for many developing countries to
embrace climate change treaties because their governments are highly
dependent on fossil fuel sales and tax revenues).
287. Lazarus et al., supra note 282, at 4 (“[D]irectly addressing fossil fuel
production, by taxing or reducing such activities, could be expected to engender
strong opposition from powerful coal, oil and gas interests.”); Samantha Gross,
Why Are Fossil Fuels so Hard to Quit, BROOKINGS INST. (June 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/essay/why-are-fossil-fuels-so-hard-to-quit/ (stating
that “fossil fuel companies are politically powerful” and discussing the
challenges of moving away from reliance on fossil fuels).
288. See Harstad 2012, supra note 248, at 77, 106.
289. The Paris Agreement, supra note 210.
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economic theory in action.290 That is, once the international
community agreed that: (1) everyone deserves to live in a world
where the average global temperature is limited to a 2° Celsius
increase, and preferably a 1.5° Celsius increase, (2) the
developed countries owe the developing countries damages for
past greenhouse gas emissions, and (3) the developing countries
would utilize their “damage awards” to reduce their own
greenhouse emissions and adjust to the effects of climate change,
the Paris Agreement parties could proceed to commit to
attempting to achieve that temperature goal and each party
could commit to an initial NDC.291 Still, it is very clear in 2022
that the Paris Agreement is not working to slow global
warming.292 As stated above, to reach the more modest goal of
preventing the increase in the average global temperature from
rising above 2°C, the Paris Agreement parties’ initial NDCs
would need to be tripled, and most of the parties are not even
reaching their very modest initial NDCs.293
In 2012, prior to the international community’s negotiation
of the Paris Agreement in 2015, Bård Harstad, a Norwegian
economist who teaches at the University of Oslo, published a
research article which analyzed the possibility that a climate
coalition could adopt supply-side policies294 and specifically
“buy . . . [fossil fuel] deposits and conserve them.”295 Naturally,
Harstad pointed out, the coalition should purchase deposits
based on their price, starting with the least expensive deposits,
or those that are marginally profitable to exploit.296 Importantly,
it is exactly these marginally profitable deposits that will be
exploited if and only if the fossil fuel price is high, that will
generate the supply-side leakage discussed above.297 When these
deposits are locked, the hazard of “supply-side leakage” is
reduced, and the coalition can then safely restrict its own

290. Pindyck, supra note 108, at 345.
291. See id. at 345–46.
292. See 2020 Tied for Warmest Year on Record, supra note 52 (noting how
2020 “was 1.84 degrees Fahrenheit (1.02 degrees Celsius) warmer than the
baseline[,] . . . making [2020 and 2016] effectively tied for the warmest year on
record”).
293. See supra text accompanying notes 218–20.
294. Harstad 2012, supra note 248, at 77–78; see also Harstad, Financial
Times, supra note 248.
295. Harstad 2012, supra note 248, at 77.
296. Id. at 85.
297. Id. at 79–80.
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production of fossil fuels without engendering supply-side
leakage.298
In addition to eliminating supply-side leakage, he noted
that such purchases of fossil fuel deposits have two additional
advantages.299 First, he explained, in such a situation, coalition
members could exclusively implement supply-side measures and
avoid implementing demand-side policies that would (in contrast
to the supply-side policies) lead to leakage.300 Second, he noted,
eliminating supply-side leakage would cause the price of fossil
fuels to rise to a high level, which in turn would make needed
investments in green technologies (including both alternative
energy technologies and carbon capture technologies) much
more attractive.301 In sum, Harstad concluded, the coalition’s
purchase and preservation of fossil fuel deposits can be the most
economically efficient method of slowing global warming.302
Below, Figure 4 demonstrates the market for the purchase of
fossil fuel deposits around the world,303 and Figure 5
demonstrates secondary effects of the coalition purchasing fossil
fuel deposits.304

298. Id.
299. Id. at 79, 93, 106; Harstad, Financial Times, supra note 248.
300. Harstad 2012, supra note 248, at 79, 93, 106.
301. Harstad, Financial Times, supra note 248; see also Harstad 2012, supra
note 248, at 79 (explaining that when the implementation of supply-side policies
equalizes consumption prices across countries, investments in technology will
become more efficient).
302. Harstad 2012, supra note 248, at 77; Harstad, Financial Times, supra
note 248.
303. Harstad Presentation, supra note 274, at 11.
304. Id. at 12.
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FIGURE 4: MARKET FOR EXTRACTION RIGHTS305

FIGURE 5: SECONDARY EFFECTS306

In this same paper, Harstad explained that a similar
“leakage” problem occurred regarding the deforestation of
tropical forests around the world.307 That is, to preserve carbon
sinks, one could boycott timber logged in tropical forests, but
that would just cause the timber price to fall and those not

305. Id. at 11.
306. Id. at 12 (figure has a few adjustments approved by Harstad).
307. Harstad 2012, supra note 248, at 83.
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participating in the boycott would be able to purchase more
timber from those forests.308 Therefore, the international
community has learned that, to forestall destruction of those
forests, “it is more effective to acquire the land or pay certain
countries directly for reducing deforestation.”309 The Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD)
program is dedicated to obtaining and distributing funds for this
specific purpose today.310
Harstad received the very prestigious biannual “Erik
Kempe prize” for the best paper in the field of environmental and
resource economics for his 2012 paper.311 Naturally, his 2012
paper built on the work of other economists, including Peter
Bohm.312 In recent years, more and more economists have
demonstrated the economic advantages of supply-side climate
policies that keep fossil fuels in the ground.313 In addition, some
308. Id.
309. Harstad, Financial Times, supra note 248.
310. Harstad 2012, supra note 248, at 83–84, 106–07.
311. Erik Kempe Award 2013: Bård Harstad, EUR. ASS’N OF ENV’T & RES.
ECONOMISTS, https://www.eaere.org/erik-kempe-award/erik-kempe-award-201
3-bard-harstad/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2021). Harstad, along with Torben K.
Mideksa, was awarded the Erik Kempe prize again in 2019, for their paper
“Conservation Contracts and Political Regimes.” Erik Kempe Award 2019: Bård
Harstad and Torben Mideksa, EUR. ASS’N OF ENV’T & RES. ECONOMISTS,
https://www.eaere.org/erik-kempe-award/erik-kempe-award-2019-bard-harsta
d-and-torben-mideksa/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2021). To read their 2019 paper, see
Bård Harstad & Torben K. Mideksa, Conservation Contracts and Political
Regimes, 84 REV. ECON. STUD. 1708 (2017). Harstad is the only economist who
has received the Erik Kempe prize twice. See The Erik Kempe Award in
Environmental and Resource Economics, EUR. ASS’N OF ENV’T & RES.
ECONOMISTS, https://www.eaere.org/erik-kempe-award/ (last visited Oct. 29,
2021).
312. See Peter Bohm, Incomplete International Cooperation to Reduce CO2
Emissions: Alternative Policies, 24 J. ENV’T ECON. & MGMT. 258 (1993)
(discussing “a policy where the price reductions from reduced fuel demand are
neutralized by fuel-deposit purchases or leases by signatory countries or an
international organization acting on their behalf”).
313. See, e.g., Lazarus et al., supra note 282, at 7–10 (discussing the multiple
advantages of supply-side policies that economists have examined); Kim Collins
& Roman Mendelevitch, Leaving Coal Unburned: Options for Demand-Side and
Supply-Side Policies, 87 DIW ROUNDUP: POLITIK IM FOKUS 1 (2015) (comparing
demand-side and supply-side policies for reducing emissions from coal
consumption); see also Hans-Werner Sinn, Public Policies Against Global
Warming: A Supply Side Approach, 15 INT. TAX & PUB. FIN. 360 (2008)
(discussing potential policy options regarding global warming from a supplyside perspective); HANS-WERNER SINN, THE GREEN PARADOX: A SUPPLY-SIDE
APPROACH TO GLOBAL WARMING (2012); Fergus Green & Richard Denniss,
Cutting With Both Arms of the Scissors: The Economic and Political Case for
Restrictive Supply-Side Climate Policies, 150 CLIMATIC CHANGE 73 (2018)
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have demonstrated the political advantages of supply-side
climate policies.314 Many environmentalists have long advocated
that governments adopt supply-side climate change policies and
restrict or ban further extraction of fossil fuels.315 Now, they can
rely on very reputable economists to support their argument.316
Harstad’s purchase proposal is essentially equivalent to
advocating that the Paris Agreement coalition enter into
conservation easements with nations that possess large fossil
fuel deposits.317 Not surprisingly then, Harstad endorsed former
Ecuadorian President Correa’s proposed conservation easement
for Ecuador’s Yasuní National Park.318 Specifically, Harstad
stated, “[t]he Yasuní-ITT Initiative seems to be a good example
of what may constitute an efficient climate policy . . . . There
exists no better climate policy than not drilling.”319
(demonstrating that restrictive supply-side policies targeting fossil fuels have
numerous economic and political advantages over similar restrictive demandside instruments); Christophe McGlade & Paul Ekins, The Geographical
Distribution of Fossil Fuels Unused When Limiting Global Warming to 2 °C, 517
NATURE 187 (2015) (finding that a large amount of fossil fuel reserves need to
remain unused from 2010 to 2050 to limit global warming to two degrees
Celsius); Asheim et al., supra note 280; Damian Carrington, Leave Fossil Fuels
Buried To Prevent Climate Change, Study Urges, GUARDIAN (Jan. 7, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jan/07/much-worlds-fossilfuel-reserve-must-stay-buried-prevent-climate-change-study-says (discussing
study conducted by McGlade and Ekins).
314. See, e.g., Green & Denniss, supra note 313, at 79–84.
315. See, e.g., David Roberts, It’s Time to Think Seriously About Cutting Off
the Supply of Fossil Fuels, VOX (May 31, 2018), https://www.vox.com/energyand-environment/2018/4/3/17187606/fossil-fuel-supply (“Policies that choke off
fossil fuels at their origin . . . have been embraced by climate activists, picking
up steam with the Keystone pipeline protests and the recent direct action of the
Valve Turners.” (emphasis omitted)); Keep It in the Ground, CTR. FOR
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/keep_it
_in_the_ground/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2021) (“[O]ur climate can’t afford any new
fossil fuel development. That’s why, since 2015, the Center has campaigned to
keep it in the ground — to stop the expansion of oil, gas and coal development
on public lands and oceans by halting new leasing and permitting.”); Julian
Spector, To Fight Climate Change, We Need To Go Beyond Burying Fossil Fuels,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-0209/environmentalists-must-go-beyond-keep-it-in-the-ground-to-fight-climatechange (“The explicit language of ‘keep it in the ground’ appears in a letter
written by 400 green advocates . . . . A bill with that name sits in the U.S.
Senate . . . . The websites of leading environmental groups like the Sierra Club
and Greenpeace proclaim Keep It in the Ground as a top priority for fighting
climate change.”).
316. See supra text accompanying notes 248–315.
317. See Harstad 2012, supra note 248, at 83.
318. Stover, supra note 21.
319. Id.
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Of course, even with the adoption of aggressive conservation
easement programs aimed at shutting down the fossil fuel
industry around the world or within the U.S., some fossil fuel
production would continue, as a conservation easement program
is voluntary.320 Hence, it would be logical for the Paris
Agreement coalition or the U.S. to also pursue conservation
easement programs aimed at preserving carbon sinks. As
prohibiting the extraction or refinement of fossil fuels can be the
most efficient method of slowing global warming,321 however,
this article focuses on conservation easements prohibiting the
extraction, refinement, sale, and distribution of fossil fuels. It
also focuses primarily on the situation in the U.S., which, as a
federal system, constitutes a coalition of governments, like the
Paris Agreement coalition, in which some of the governments are
attempting to reduce CO2 emissions and slow global warming
and some are not.322
B. IT IS ECONOMICALLY EFFICIENT FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
TO PAY U.S. FOSSIL FUEL OWNERS NOT TO EXTRACT THEIR
FOSSIL FUELS.
As stated above, the U.S. is a coalition of governments, some
of which are attempting to reduce CO2 emissions and slow global
warming and some are not.323 Hence, when considering the U.S.
as an independent entity, the most economically efficient

320. See, e.g., Phil Willon, Must Reads: Will Newsom End Drilling in
California? Many Environmentalists Are Betting Yes, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 23,
2019), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-gavin-newsom-fracking-oildrilling-ban-20190423-story.html (noting that California Democratic Governor
Gavin Newsom recognized that, “despite his strong support for putting
California on a path to a 100% renewable energy supply, it would be unrealistic
to think that California can just stop its dependence on oil and gas”); see also
supra note 63 and accompanying text.
321. See Harstad 2012, supra note 248, at 77; Harstad, Financial Times,
supra note 248.
322. See, e.g., Sam Ricketts et al., States Are Laying a Road Map for Climate
Leadership, AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.americanprogress
.org/issues/green/reports/2020/04/30/484163/states-laying-road-map-climateleadership (“[S]tate governments across the United States are taking
meaningful action against climate change and toward building a clean energy
economy.”); Dan Charles, North Dakota Officials Block Wind Power In Effort To
Save Coal, NPR (Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/02/25/965775584
/north-dakota-officials-block-wind-power-in-effort-to-save-coal (“Two [North
Dakota] counties . . . have enacted drastic restrictions on new wind projects in
an attempt to save coal mining jobs, despite protests from landowners who’d
like to rent their land to wind energy companies.”).
323. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
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method for the U.S. to pursue to slow global warming likewise
can be to keep fossil fuels in the ground.324
Due to the large political support for the fossil fuel industry
in several U.S. states which possess significant quantities of
fossil fuels, the strong support for the fossil fuel industry in the
U.S. Congress, and the heavy subsidization of the fossil fuel
industry in the U.S., it is very unlikely that the federal or any
state government would simply ban or materially restrict the
extraction, refinement, sale, or distribution of fossil fuels within
the next few years.325 This is true regardless of whether a
government would be willing to compensate the fossil fuel
owners for that action.326 At the same time, as discussed above,
the U.S. Congress could implement a voluntary conservation
easement program as a method for keeping much of U.S. fossil
fuel reserves in the ground,327 and the U.S. Government
probably would have to pay fossil fuel owners 100% of the value
of their operations for such easements.328 Accordingly, as
discussed above in Section VI of this paper, it is recommended
324. See Harstad 2012, supra note 248, at 77; Harstad, Financial Times,
supra note 248.
325. See David Roberts, Friendly Policies Keep US Oil and Coal Afloat Far
More Than We Thought, VOX (July 26, 2018), https://www.vox.com/energy-andenvironment/2017/10/6/16428458/us-energy-coal-oil-subsidies (explaining that
the fossil fuel industry is heavily subsidized by both the state and federal
government).
326. See, e.g., Robinson Meyer, The Oil Industry Is Quietly Winning Local
Climate Fights, ATLANTIC (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/science
/archive/2020/02/oil-industry-fighting-climate-policy-states/606640
(stating
that the American Petroleum Institute (API) does not support a carbon tax or
any other policy that would reduce fossil-fuel use).
327. See supra text accompanying notes 233–46. Of course, as Harstad
explained so well, if the U.S. is the only fossil fuel-producing country that
restricts fossil fuel extraction through a conservation easement program, then
the other fossil-fuel-producing nations around the world will simply increase
their own extractions of fossil fuels. Harstad 2012, supra note 248, at 78–80. In
other words, such a supply-side policy will lead to supply-side carbon leakage.
Id. at 80. Still, it makes sense for the U.S. to be the early adopter of such a
conservation easement program, as such a program appears to be an
economically efficient method for combatting climate change in general and the
major international climate change agreements emphasize that the “developed
country Parties should take the lead in combatting climate change.” Torben K.
Mideksa, Leadership and Climate Policy 1 (Munich Soc’y for the
Promotion of Econ. Research, CESifo Working Paper No. 9054, 2021), https://w
ww.cesifo.org/en/publikationen/2021/working-paper/leadership-and-climatepolicy (quoting Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC and stating that “[b]oth the Kyoto
Protocol and the Paris Agreement encourage the developed countries to take a
lead in reducing emissions”).
328. See supra text accompanying note 235.
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that the IRC be amended to provide that fossil fuel owners can
be compensated for agreeing not to extract, refine, sell, or
distribute their fossil fuels and receive a credit (rather than a
deduction) for the full value of their fossil fuel operations.329
This section considers whether it would be economically
efficient for the U.S. Government to implement such a program
of conservation easements within the U.S. territory. In other
words, it considers whether the value of U.S. producers’ and
refiners’ businesses is lower than the costs imposed on society by
the burning of those fossil fuels (assuming, for purposes of this
section, that the U.S. can afford to pay that value).
As stated above, in valuing any particular conservation
easement being granted to the U.S. Government, the U.S.
Government should consider valuations of comparable
easements.330 If there are no sale prices for comparable
easements, the easement should be valued as the difference
between the value of the taxpayer’s property with the easement
and the value of the taxpayer’s property without the easement,
taking into account all relevant factors regarding a fossil fuel
owner/taxpayer’s operation, including, for example, the type of
fossil fuel concerned, the quantity of that fuel, the cost of
extracting or refining the fuel, the anticipated sales revenue for
that fuel, and the fundamental financials of the operation,
including cash flow and debt level.331 Those individuals or
entities whose operations are or would be borderline profitable,
especially those who have not yet incurred “sunk capital
costs,”332 would be most likely to take advantage of such a
329. See supra text accompanying notes 232–46.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 69–70.
331. See supra text accompanying note 71. The U.S. Government could pay
fossil fuel owners something like $5/ton of carbon dioxide emissions avoided,
which is what the GCF pays landowners in developing countries who agree to
preserve their lands as carbon sinks. See, e.g., Bruno Vander Velde, New
Climate Funding Pays to Protect Forests, CONSERVATION INT’L (Oct. 4, 2017),
https://www.conservation.org/blog/new-climate-funding-pays-to-protect-forests
(“Countries can apply to sell verified emissions reductions — each one of them
representing 1 ton of avoided carbon dioxide emissions — to the GCF, at a price
of US$ 5 per ton.”). However, the value paid for conservation easements granted
by fossil fuel owners would need to be high enough to entice the owners to grant
such easements, as society needs the owners to stop extracting, refining, selling,
and distributing their fossil fuels.
332. See RICHARD BARON & DAVID FISCHER, OECD, DIVESTMENT AND
STRANDED ASSETS IN THE LOW-CARBON TRANSITION 7 n.1, https://www
.oecd.org/sd-roundtable/papersandpublications/Divestment%20and%20Strand
ed%20Assets%20in%20the%20Low-carbon%20Economy%2032nd%20OECD%
20RTSD.pdf; Daniel Rosenbloom, Breaking Carbon Lock-In Through
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conservation easement program, just as Harstad’s abovediscussed economic analysis predicts.333 It should be
emphasized, though, that there is an incentive for all fossil fuel
owners to enter into such conservation easements sooner rather
than later, as the value of each owner’s fossil fuels is likely to
decrease over the next several years, given the local air pollution
and CO2 emissions caused by the burning of those fossil fuels
and the consequent unpopularity of those fuels.334
Financial experts reported that, in 2020, the value of that
segment of the U.S. fossil fuel industry that explores for,
extracts, and refines oil, gas, and coal was approximately
$686.83 billion.335 The $686.83 billion figure is higher than the
Innovation and Decline, WORLD RESOURCES INST., https://files.wri.org/expertperspective-rosenbloom_0.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2021); Stranded Assets and
Renewables: How the Energy Transition Affects the Value of Energy Reserves,
Buildings and Capital Stock 9, 30 (Int’l Renewable Energy
Agency, Working Paper, July 2017), https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IREN
A/Agency/Publication/2017/Jul/IRENA_REmap_Stranded_assets_and_renewa
bles_2017.pdf.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 296–97.
334. See, e.g., supra note 238 and accompanying text.
335. This figure was calculated by starting with the $4,677.45 billion value
figure for the global oil and gas market in 2020. Global $7425.02 Billion Oil and
Gas Markets, 2015-2020, 2020-2025F, 2030F, GLOBENEWSWIRE (Mar. 4, 2021),
https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2021/03/04/2187025/0/en/Global7425-02-Billion-Oil-and-Gas-Markets-2015-2020-2020-2025F-2030F.html#:~:
text=filingsmedia%20partners-,Global%20%247425.02%20Billion%20Oil%
20and%20Gas%20Markets%2C%202015,2020%2C%202020%2D2025F%2C%
202030F&text=The%20global%20oil%20and%20gas,(CAGR)%20of%2025.5%2
5
[hereinafter
GLOBENEWSWIRE]
(discussing
the
data
that
ResearchAndMarkets had presented in its study entitled “Oil and Gas Global
Market Report 2021: COVID-19 Impact and Recovery to 2030”). The $4,677.45
billion figure was then multiplied by 19% to arrive at the figure of $888.7155
billion, as this same article states that North American production is
responsible for 19% of the total value figure. Id. Then, actual oil and gas
production figures in 2019 for the U.S., Canada, and Mexico were compared to
calculate the percentage that the U.S. oil and gas industry contributes to the
North American oil and gas industry. Specifically, U.S. oil production figures
for 2019 were obtained from the U.S. Energy Information Administration. U.S.
Crude Oil Production Grew 11% in 2019, Surpassing 12 Million Barrels Per
Day, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.eia.gov/todayinen
ergy/detail.php?id=43015. Canadian oil production figures for 2019 were
obtained from Statistics Canada. Supply and Disposition of Crude Oil and
Equivalent, STATISTICS CAN. (Aug. 10, 2021), https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1
/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=2510006301&pickMembers%5B0%5D=1.1&cubeTimeFr
ame.startMonth=01&cubeTimeFrame.startYear=2019&cubeTimeFrame.endM
onth=12&cubeTimeFrame.endYear=2019&referencePeriods=20190101%2C20
191201. The Mexican oil production figures for 2019 were obtained from a report
by the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Executive Summary, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.eia.gov/international/analy
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value of only the operations of the producers and the refiners,336
but if it is economically efficient for the U.S. Government to pay
the $686.83 billion, it is economically efficient to pay the smaller
figure for just the producers’ and refiners’ businesses.
Alternatively, financial experts project that, in 2021, the value
of that segment of the U.S. fossil fuel industry that explores for,
extracts, and refines oil, gas, and coal will be approximately
$858.4 billion,337 and this may be a fairer figure to utilize for the
value of the U.S. fossil fuel industry, as the value of the industry
was unnaturally suppressed by the COVID-19 virus in 2020.338
sis/country/MEX. The U.S. and Canadian natural gas production figures for
2019 were obtained from Natural Resources Canada. Natural Gas Facts, NAT.
RES. CAN., https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/science-data/data-analysis/energy-data-an
alysis/energy-facts/natural-gas-facts/20067 (last visited Oct. 29, 2021). Mexican
natural gas production figures for 2019 were obtained from Statista in an article
written by Bruna Alves. Bruna Alves, Mexico: Monthly Natural Gas Production
2019-2020, STATISTA (July 2, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/751410
/mexico-natural-gas-production/. Cubic feet of natural gas were translated into
oil barrel equivalents for comparison at the rate of 5,614 cubic feet of natural
gas for each barrel of crude oil. Reference Tools, INDEP. PETROLEUM ASS’N OF
AM., https://www.ipaa.org/reference-tools/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2021). These
production figures revealed that the U.S. oil and gas industry constitutes 75%
of the North American oil and gas industry. Accordingly, the $888.7155 billion
figure was multiplied by 75%, resulting in a figure of $666.54 billion for the
value of the U.S. oil and gas industry in 2020. This figure was added to the
$20.29 billion value of the U.S. coal industry in 2020, as reported by Melissa
Garside. Melissa Garside, U.S. Coal Mining Market Value 2010-2020, STATISTA
(Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/1137311/market-size-of-coal
-mining-in-the-us/. Together, these figures total $686.83 billion for the value of
the U.S. fossil fuel industry in 2020.
336. See GLOBENEWSWIRE, supra note 335 (“The oil and gas market consists
of sales of oil and gas by entities . . . that undertake the exploration for,
extraction, drilling, and refining, of oil and gas and some of its derivatives.”).
337. This figure was calculated by multiplying the 2021 global oil and gas
industry value of $5,870.13 billion by 19% to determine the 2021 value for the
North American oil and gas industry value of $1,115.33 billion.
GLOBENEWSWIRE, supra note 335. Then, the $1,115.33 billion figure was
multiplied by 75%, to determine the U.S. oil and gas industry value of $836.5
billion, as the U.S. constitutes 75% of the North American oil and gas industry.
Supra note 335. Then, the 2020 value for the U.S. coal industry was multiplied
by 7.8%, as financial experts project that the U.S. coal industry will produce
7.8% more coal in 2021 than it did in 2020. Tyler Godwin, US 2021 Coal
Production Estimated to Rise 7.8% on Year: EIA, S&P GLOB. (Mar. 9, 2021),
https://www.spglobal.com/platts/es/market-insights/latest-news/coal/030921us-2021-coal-production-estimated-to-rise-78-on-year-eia. Finally, the U.S. oil
and gas value figure for 2021 was added to the U.S. coal value figure for 2021,
for a total of $858.4 billion.
338. See, e.g., Divy Malik et al., The Impact of COVID-19 on the Global
Petrochemical Industry, MCKINSEY & CO. (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.
mckinsey.com/industries/chemicals/our-insights/the-impact-of-covid-19-on-theglobal-petrochemical-industry#; Ivan Penn, Oil Companies Are Collapsing, but
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Again, the 2021 figure of $858.4 billion is higher than the value
of only the operations of the producers and the refiners,339 but if
it is economically efficient for the U.S. Government to pay the
$858.4 billion figure, it is economically efficient to pay the
smaller amount for just the producers’ and refiners’ businesses.
One accepted method of valuing a business is to multiply a
recent annual profit figure (or, sometimes, a recent figure for
“Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and
Amortization” or “EBITDA”) by the appropriate number of
years.340 The appropriate multiplier varies widely depending on
the industry or company, from one times the profit level for “a
small, personal service business where the new owner will be the
only, or one of the only, professional service providers,” to eight
to ten times the profit level for “[a]n extremely well-established
and steady business with a rock-solid market position, whose
continued earnings will not be dependent upon a strong
management team.”341 For “middle-market companies with
sales of several million dollars up to several hundred million
dollars, . . . assuming modest growth of low to high single digits,
a common fair valuation range is five to seven times EBITDA.”342
Most U.S. fossil fuel owners probably fit into this last
category.343
As illustrated below in Figure 7, the annual profits of the
entire U.S. fossil fuel industry in 2017 were approximately
$120.7 billion,344 and five times that figure is $603.5 billion and
seven times that figure is $844.9 is billion. Once again, this profit
figure is larger than just the profit figure for the producers and
refiners, but if it is economically efficient for the U.S.

Wind and Solar Energy Keep Growing, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2021), https://www
.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/business/energy-environment/coronavirus-oil-windsolar-energy.html.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 335–37.
340. See Armin Laidre, Business Valuation Methods with Examples,
EXITADVISER, https://exitadviser.com/business-value.aspx?id=business-valuati
on-methods (last visited Oct. 30, 2021); Kison Patel, A Review of Business
Valuation Methods Available to Buyers, DEALROOM, https://dealroom.net/blog
/company-valuation-methods (last visited Oct. 30, 2021).
341. Bob Adams, Fast and Simple Business Valuation, BUSINESSTOWN,
https://businesstown.com/articles/fast-and-simple-business-valuation/
(last
visited Oct. 30, 2021).
342. Id.
343. See Who Are America’s Independent Producers, INDEP. PETROLEUM
ASS’N OF AM., https://www.ipaa.org/independent-producers/ (last visited Oct.
30, 2021).
344. See infra text accompanying note 352.
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Government to pay the larger amount for the entire industry, it
is economically efficient for the U.S. Government to pay the
smaller amount for just the producers’ and refiners’ businesses.
The highest valuation of the U.S. fossil fuel industry, based
on the above-discussed valuation figures, is $858.4 billion. As
demonstrated in Figure 6, the local air pollution and global
warming costs imposed on society by the burning of U.S. fossil
fuels has steadily increased since 2010 and totaled $454.1 billion
in 2017 alone. The 2017 figures for post-tax subsidies
(externalities, or, in other words, costs imposed on society by a
party that does not pay for those costs)345 reported in Figure 6
are the most recent figures available for the costs imposed on
society by the burning of U.S. fossil fuels. However, such costs
have continued to rise after 2017, as the burning of U.S. fossil
fuels has continued to increase since 2017, with a possible dip in
such costs for 2020 due to the disruption of many fossil fuel
business operations by the COVID-19 pandemic.346
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

163.4

169.6

171.6

179.2

188.3

186.7

201.2

212

174.7

190.5

201.9

217.9

236.7

240.4

245.7

242.1

152.6

157.2

164.7

171.4

183

186.2

193.3

187.7

35.8

41.6

40.3

41.4

42.1

33.9

31.9

34.7

526.4

558.8

578.5

610

650.1

647.2

672.1

676.6

Global
Warming
Local

Air

Pollution
Vehicle
Extern.
Foregone
Tax
Revenue
TOTAL

FIGURE 6: POST-TAX SUBSIDIES PROVIDED TO THE U.S.
FOSSIL FUEL INDUSTRY347 (U.S. $ BILLIONS)

345. See Externalities, supra note 45.
346. Rebecca Lindsey, Climate Change: Atmospheric Carbon, CLIMATE.GOV
(Oct. 7, 2021), https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate
/climate-change-atmospheric-carbon-dioxide; Carbon Dioxide Levels Continue
at Record Levels, Despite COVID-19 Lockdown, WORLD METEOROLOGICAL
ORG. (Nov. 23, 2020), https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/carbondioxide-levels-continue-record-levels-despite-covid-19-lockdown.
347. Le et al., supra note 46.
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Rounding the industry valuation up to $1 trillion and using
the 2017 figure of $454.1 billion for the local air pollution and
global warming costs imposed on society in 2017, it clearly would
be economically efficient for the U.S. Government to pay the $1
trillion in value for the U.S. fossil fuel industry to avoid such
costs, as such costs would total $1 trillion in only 2.2 years.
The fact that it would be economically efficient for the U.S.
Government to pay the producers and refiners not to extract,
refine, sell or distribute their fossil fuels may be easier to
comprehend by considering the relevant figures for just one year,
given that a multiple of annual profits or EBITDA is an
acceptable method of valuing a business or industry.348 That is,
if the costs imposed by the burning of U.S. fossil fuels in a
particular year exceed the entire industry’s profits for that year,
that also would suggest that it would be economically efficient
for the U.S. Government to pay the producers and refiners not
to extract, refine, sell, or distribute their fossil fuels. The year
2017 is utilized in this analysis, as 2017 figures are available for
both U.S. fossil fuel industry profits and the post-tax subsidies
provided to the industry. As explained further below, pre-tax
subsidies for 2015 to 2016 are used as a proxy for pre-tax
subsidies for 2017, as 2017 pre-tax subsidy figures are
unavailable and the 2017 figures would be even higher than the
2016 figures.349 Pre-tax subsidies are all subsidies except for
externalities,350 or, in other words, costs imposed by a party that
are not paid by that party.351
As Figure 7 reveals, profits for the entire U.S. fossil fuel
industry in 2017 were approximately $120.7 billion.352
348. Laidre, supra note 340; Patel, supra note 340.
349. See infra text accompanying note 357.
350. See Coady et al., supra note 44, at 7–8.
351. See Externalities, supra note 45.
352. The profit figures reported in Figure 7 were calculated based on a
reported $257 billion in profits for the fossil fuel industry in North America in
2014 (the height of the industry). $257 Billion, OIL CHANGE INT’L (May 2015),
http://priceofoil.org/profits-oil-gas-coal-companies-operating-u-s-canada/
[hereinafter Profits for Oil, Gas & Coal]; Lorne Stockman, Newsletter: Despite
Falling Prices North America’s Fossil Fuel Sector Makes Healthy Profits, OIL
CHANGE INT’L (May 5, 2015), http://priceofoil.org/2015/05/05/despite-fallingprices-north-americas-fossil-fuel-sector-makes-healthy-profits/ (clarifying that
the above-referenced Oil Change International article was reporting on profits
for all of North America, not just the U.S. and Canada). As the U.S. constitutes
75% of the North American fossil fuel industry, supra note 335, this $257 billion
figure for 2014 was multiplied by 75% to obtain the profit figure of $192.8 billion
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YEAR
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

128.5

158.5

153.1

171.4

192.8

114.8

91.2

120.7

159.4

FIGURE 7: PROFITS OF THE ENTIRE U.S. FOSSIL FUEL
INDUSTRY353 (U.S. $ BILLIONS)

The profit level for just the producers and refiners would be
lower than this figure. However, if the costs imposed by the
burning of fossil fuels in 2017 exceed the entire industry’s profits
for 2017, those costs certainly would exceed the profits of just the
producers and refiners in 2017. In addition, all the costs imposed
by local air pollution and global warming resulting from the
burning of U.S. fossil fuels in 2017 should be attributed to the
producers and refiners.
In contrast, as Figure 6 reveals, global warming and health
care costs attributable to local air pollution created by the
burning of U.S. fossil fuels in 2017 were $212 billion and $242.1
billion, respectively, for a total of $454.1 billion.354 Just
comparing the $454.1 billion annual cost to the $120.7 billion
annual profit for the entire industry demonstrates that it would
be economically efficient for the U.S. Government to pay
producers and refiners the value of their businesses, in exchange

for the U.S. fossil fuel industry in 2014. Then, the profit figure for the U.S. fossil
fuel industry for each of the years 2010 to 2013 and 2015 to 2018 was
determined by using the growth/decline rate of the revenues of the U.S. oil and
gas industries during the years 2010 to 2018. The growth/decline rates would
be lower if revenues for the U.S. coal industry were included, but this would
mean that the profits of the U.S. fossil fuel industry were at least as high as the
figures reflected in Figure 7. Note, the profit figures reported in Figure 7 do not
include the profits of privately held U.S. fossil fuel companies. Profit figures for
these companies are unavailable because these companies do not have to report
their financials to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). U.S.
Private Companies, LIBRARY OF CONG., https://guides.loc.gov/companyresearch/private (last visited Oct. 30, 2021) (“Unlike public companies, private
companies are not required to file with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).”); Profits for Oil, Gas & Coal, supra note 352 (noting that
profits of privately-held fossil fuel companies cannot be ascertained).
353. Profits for Oil, Gas & Coal, supra note 352.
354. Le et al., supra note 46; Coady et al., supra note 44.
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for their promises not to extract, refine, sell, or distribute any
further fossil fuels.355
To add insult to injury, much of the industry’s profits of
approximately $120.7 billion for 2017 would disappear in the
absence of the substantial pre-tax subsidies that the U.S. federal
and state governments provided to producers and consumers in
2017.356 The pre-tax subsidy figures for 2015 to 2016 that are
reported in Figure 8 are the most recent pre-tax subsidy figures
available. Because the 2017 pre-tax subsidy figures would be
even higher due to the Trump Administration significantly
increasing pre-tax subsidies to the fossil fuel industry,357 the
2015 to 2016 figures are used as a proxy for 2017 figures. The
definition of the term “subsidy” used in this paper is the
definition used by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) and the World Trade Organization
(WTO), which is “any government action that lowers the cost of
production, lowers the cost of consumption, or raises the price
received by producers.”358

355. See Joseph E. Aldy, Professor of the Practice of Pub. Policy, Harvard
Kennedy Sch., Statement of Joseph E. Aldy, United States House Committee
on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on Environment, Hearing on “The
Role of Fossil Fuel Subsidies in Preventing Action on the Climate Crisis” 1
(Apr. 22, 2021), https://media.rff.org/documents/Joseph_Aldy_-_Testimony__April_2021.pdf (“To the extent U.S. production subsidies increase hydrocarbon
consumption, the adverse public health, climate change, and labor productivity
losses from pollution resulting from fossil fuel combustion could exceed the
market value of these fuels.”).
356. See infra text accompanying notes 358–65.
357. See, e.g., Erin Auel, The Trump Budget Is Full of Giveaways to Coal and
Oil Companies, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www
.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2018/02/15/446678/trump-budgetfull-giveaways-coal-oil-companies/; Dana Nuccitelli, Trump’s Plan to Bail Out
Failing Fossil Fuels with Taxpayer Subsidies Is Perverse, GUARDIAN (Oct. 9,
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-percent/2017/oct/09/trumps-plan-to-bail-out-failing-fossil-fuels-with-taxpayersubsidies-is-perverse; Kevin Crowley, Biden Tax Plan Targets Fossil Fuel
Subsidies Worth $35 Billion, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 8, 2021), https://www
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-07/biden-tax-plan-targets-fossil-fuelsubsidies-worth-35-billion.
358. JANET REDMAN ET AL., OIL CHANGE INT’L, DIRTY ENERGY DOMINANCE:
DEPENDENT ON DENIAL 7 & n.b (Oct. 2017), http://priceofoil.org/content
/uploads/2017/10/OCI_US-Fossil-Fuel-Subs-2015-16_Final_Oct2017.pdf
[hereinafter OIL CHANGE INTERNATIONAL 2017] (relying on and citing definition
used by the OECD and WTO).
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PRE-TAX SUBSIDY TYPE
Producer Subsidies – Federal
Producer Subsidies – State
Consumer Subsidies
Overseas Development
U.S. Military
TOTAL
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14.7
5.8
14.5
2.1
81
118.1

FIGURE 8: PRE-TAX SUBSIDIES PROVIDED TO THE U.S.
FOSSIL FUEL INDUSTRY IN 2017 (USING 2015-2016 FIGURES
AS A PROXY FOR 2017 FIGURES)359 (U.S. $ BILLIONS)

Conservative estimates of the subsidies that the federal and
state governments provided to U.S. fossil fuel producers (on
average in 2015 and 2016) are $14.7 billion and $5.8 billion,
respectively, for a total of $20.5 billion.360 Consumer subsidies
359. Id. at 5, 10, 21–22, 27, 34, app. I (Appendix I contains complete list of
state and federal production subsidies, which relies heavily on the OECD’s
database of fossil fuel subsidies around the world); Tom DiChristopher, U.S.
Spends $81 Billion a Year to Protect Global Oil Supplies, Report Estimates,
CNBC (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/21/us-spends-81-billiona-year-to-protect-oil-supplies-report-estimates.html (discussing comprehensive
study of U.S. military costs related to fossil fuels conducted by Securing
America’s Future Energy (SAFE)).
360. OIL CHANGE INTERNATIONAL 2017, supra note 358, at 5, 10, 16-–19, 27,
34. A list of the major tax break programs through which most of the federal
producer subsidies are provided can be found on page eleven of the report. A
complete list of the specific federal and state production subsidies is provided
in Appendix I. Several commentators have reported that U.S. governments
provide approximately $20 billion per year in subsidies to fossil fuel producers,
but most appear to be relying on the Oil Change International 2017 report or
the OECD database, upon which the Oil Change International 2017 report
heavily relies, for this figure. See Nuccitelli, supra note 357; Fact Sheet, supra
note 37. At the same time, this $20 billion annual figure for producer subsidies
is not an unusually high figure. In a 2014 study, Oil Change International
reported that the federal and state governments provided $21.6 billion in
exploration and production subsidies in 2013. SHAKUNTALA MAKHIJANI, OIL
CHANGE INT’L, CASHING IN ON ALL OF THE ABOVE: U.S. FOSSIL FUEL
PRODUCTION SUBSIDIES UNDER OBAMA 4, 7 (July 2014), http://priceofoil
.org/content/uploads/2014/07/OCI_US_FF_Subsidies_Final_Screen.pdf; see also
Simon Denyer, Richest Nations Fail To Agree on Deadline To Phase out Fossil
Fuel Subsidies, WASH. POST (July 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/world/richest-nations-fail-to-agree-on-deadline-to-phase-out-fossil-fuel-subsidi
es/2016/07/01/7db563fb-42f0-46c8-bea4-2fcfc0f48c69_story.html (discussing Oil
Change International’s 2014 study). In 2018, the National Resources Defense
Council (NRDC) published a study concluding that the federal and state
governments provided tax breaks totaling $26 billion and favorable financing
totaling $1.4 billion to fossil fuel producers. Han Chen &
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(subsidies provided to consumers to lower their price of fossil
fuels) totaled approximately $14.5 billion annually,361 and the
Danielle Droitsch, Time for the US to End Fossil Fuel Subsidies, NRDC (June
3, 2018), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/danielle-droitsch/time-us-end-fossil-fuel
-subsidies; Phil Dzikiy, Fossil Fuel Subsidies Top $5 Trillion Worldwide,
Fair Pricing Would Have Cut Emissions 28%, Study Says, ELECTREK (May 9,
2019), https://electrek.co/2019/05/09/fossil-fuel-subsidies-trillions/.
Another
report states that “[o]ther credible estimates of annual United States fossil fuel
subsidies range from $10 billion to $52 billion annually – yet none of these
include[s] costs borne by taxpayers related to the climate, local environmental,
and health impacts of the fossil fuel industry.” Fossil Fuel Subsidies Overview,
OIL CHANGE INT’L, http://priceofoil.org/fossil-fuel-subsidies/ (last visited Oct.
30, 2021). The OECD database of fossil fuel subsidies indicates that the U.S.
federal and state governments provided only $6,169,088,982 in subsidies to
fossil fuel producers in 2017. OECD Inventory of Support Measures for Fossil
Fuels, OECD, https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=FFS_USA (last
visited Oct. 30, 2021) (select “Budgetary Transfer” or Tax Expenditure” from
the “Mechanism” tab and “Federal” or “Sub” or “Both” from the “Level” tab).
However, the OECD database was not complete, so Oil Change International
supplemented the OECD database in its own 2017 report discussed above. See
OIL CHANGE INTERNATIONAL 2017, supra note 358, at 19 n.64 (“Our state
subsidy estimates benefited from OECD’s 2015 Inventory of Support Measures
for Fossil Fuels. Three state subsidies were directly over from their U.S. fossil
fuel support inventory, which can be found at http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx
?DataSetCode=FFS_USA.”); see also Explainer: The Challenge of Defining
Fossil Fuel Subsidies, CARBONBRIEF (June 12, 2017), https://www.carbonbrief
.org/explainer-the-challenge-of-defining-fossil-fuel-subsidies (explaining that
the OECD originally did not track public finance subsidies provided to the fossil
fuel industry); OECD: Fossil Fuel Subsidies Added up to At Least $373bn in
2015, CARBONBRIEF (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.carbonbrief.org/oecd-fossilfuel-subsidies-373-billion-2015. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
reported that the U.S. provided only $1.09 billion in pre-tax subsidies to its U.S.
fossil fuel industry. Le et al., supra note 46. The IMF states that it based this
figure on the OECD’s Inventory of Support Measures for Fossil Fuels. See Coady
et al., supra note 44, at 16. However, the OECD’s Inventory of Support
Measures for Fossil Fuels reports a much higher figure, as previously noted. An
IMF researcher who worked on the IMF’s report replied to an inquiry regarding
this $1.09 billion figure, confirming that the IMF did not include any U.S.
military costs and stating that perhaps the IMF only reported the subsidies that
the U.S. federal government had provided to producers (see email from IMF
Researcher Piotr Le to the author, (on file with the Law Review)), but even the
$1.3 billion figure reported by the OECD for producer subsidies provided by the
U.S. federal government is higher than the $1.09 billion figure reported by the
IMF for all pre-tax subsidies. It is possible that the IMF did not include in its
pre-tax subsidy figure any subsidies provided by the U.S. federal or state
governments to the oil industry. See Le et al., supra note 46 (noting that its
$1.09 billion figure comprises $410 million for the coal industry and $670
million for the natural gas industry, implying that no subsidies to the oil
industry were included).
361. OIL CHANGE INTERNATIONAL 2017, supra note 358, at 7, 22 & nn.95–
96 (“U.S. federal and state governments provide an estimated $14.5 billion
annually in consumption subsidies that reduce the cost of fossil fuel energy use
by end-users. This annual estimate combines a federal annual average for 2015
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U.S. federal government also provided approximately $2.1
billion per year to assist fossil fuel producers to develop fossil
fuel deposits outside of the U.S. in 2015 and 2016.362 In addition,
the U.S. military incurs costs of approximately $81 billion per
year just to secure oil distribution channels around the world.363
This is a very conservative figure for U.S. military costs, as it
concerns only oil, not gas or coal,364 and no alternative fuel
industry, like the solar or wind power industries, is provided
with a free global security service.365 The sum of all of these pretax subsidies in 2017 is $118.1 billion, as shown in Figure 8, and
the overwhelming majority of these subsidies were provided by
the U.S. federal government. Specifically, only the $5.8 billion
that states provided to producers and the $2.8 billion that states
provided to consumers were not provided by the federal
government.366 If all of these pre-tax subsidies in 2017, totaling
$118.1 billion, are deducted from the industry’s profits of
approximately $120.7 billion in 2017, the industry’s 2017 profits
decline to only $2.6 billion.
Furthermore, in 2017, U.S. states lost $34.7 billion in sales
tax revenue (referred to as “foregone tax revenue” in Figure 6
above) on account of the unnaturally low, subsidized price of
fossil fuel.367 They also incurred costs of approximately $187.1
billion for traffic jams and vehicle accidents (referred to as
“vehicle externalities” in Figure 6 above) that would not have
occurred but for that unnaturally low, subsidized fossil fuel price
to 2016, including LIHEAP ($3.4 billion) and Highway Trust Fund ($8.3 billion)
spending, and state-level totals for 2014 ($2.8 billion), which come from OECD’s
state inventory of direct consumer support subsidies.” (footnotes omitted)).
362. See id. at 21.
363. Tom DiChristopher, U.S. Spends $81 Billion a Year to Protect Global
Oil Supplies, Report Estimates, CNBC (Sept. 21, 2018), https://
www.cnbc.com/2018/09/21/us-spends-81-billion-a-year-to-protect-oil-suppliesreport-estimates.html (discussing the conclusions of comprehensive study
published by Securing America’s Future Energy (SAFE)); see also The Military
Cost of Defending Global Oil Supplies, SAFE (Sept. 20, 2018),
https://secureenergy.org/military-cost-defending-global-oil-supplies/
[hereinafter SecureEnergy]. The full study conducted by SAFE can be found at:
http://secureenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Military-Cost-ofDefending-the-Global-Oil-Supply.-Sep.-18.-2018.pdf.
364. DiChristopher, supra note 363; see also SecureEnergy, supra note 363.
365. See Umair Irfan, Fossil Fuels Are Underpriced by a Whopping $5.2
Trillion, VOX (May 17, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/5/17/18624740/fossil-f
uel-subsidies-climate-imf.
366. OIL CHANGE INTERNATIONAL 2017, supra note 358, at 5, 22.
367. See Le et al., supra note 46 (enter “U.S.” and “2017”); Coady et al., supra
note 44, at 7, 19–21.
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(as drivers would have patronized public transportation
more).368 These last two figures, along with the figures for the
CO2 emissions added to the atmosphere and the healthcare costs
incurred due to local air pollution, typically are considered to be
“post-tax subsidies,” and they totaled $676.6 billion, as shown in
Figure 6 above.
If the post-tax subsidies totaling $676.6 billion for 2017 are
added to the pre-tax subsidies of $118.1 billion for 2017, the total
of all subsidies is $794.7 billion, and the U.S. fossil fuel industry
actually lost $674 billion in 2017. Clearly, the U.S. fossil fuel
industry is not pursuing a sustainable business model. No
private company would spend $794.7 billion annually to obtain
annual profits of only $120.7 billion. And, of course, the U.S.
population should not continue to spend $794.7 billion annually
so that the U.S. fossil fuel industry by itself can enjoy annual
profits of $120.7 billion. To be sure, government entities in the
U.S. to date have not spent all of the costs indicated above for
the remediation of local air pollution and global warming.
Nonetheless, those costs are, in fact, accruing and will have to
be paid.369
Within the discipline of liberal economics upon which
capitalism is based,370 subsidies are very disfavored.371
According to the tenets of liberal economics, demand and supply
should determine the range of goods and services available in
the marketplace, and subsidies cause goods and services to be
provided that otherwise would not be provided and take
resources away from goods and services that otherwise would be
provided.372 Only when there is a market failure—e.g., an infant

368. Le et al., supra note 46 (enter “U.S.” and “2017”); Coady et al., supra
note 44, at 13–14.
369. See The Hidden Costs of Fossil Fuels, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/hidden-costsfossil-fuels; see also Jon Heggie, Making the Change: Breaking Our Fossil Fuel
Habit, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.nationalgeographic
.com/science/article/partner-content-breaking-our-fossil-fuel-habit.
370. See Sarwat Jahan & Ahmed Saber Mahmud, What is Capitalism?, 52
FIN. & DEV. 44 (2015).
371. See, e.g., Jehan Sauvage, Why Government Subsidies Are Bad for
Global Competition, OECD (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.oecd.org/trade/whysubsidies-are-bad-global-competition/ (analogizing subsidies to doping in sports
by the way they undermine fairness and competition).
372. See MARC BACCHETTA ET AL., WTO, The Economics of Subsidies, in
WORLD TRADE REPORT 2006, at 55, 55–62 (2007), https://www.wto.org/english
/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report06_e.pdf (rejecting subsidies in
“perfect market” conditions).
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industry that society wants but would fail on its own, or a nearmonopolist that is driving out all competitors in an industry—
would subsidies be justified.373 There is no market failure that
would justify the enormous subsidies that governments in the
U.S. provide to the fossil fuel industry.374 This industry is not an
infant industry but rather a very mature one, and it has been
receiving enormous subsidies for many years.375 At one point,
the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OAPEC) might have been considered at least an oligopolist that
the U.S. needed to counter for national security reasons, but the
threat of the U.S.’ dependence on a foreign source of energy has
long since dissipated.376 Despite the economic disadvantages of
government subsidies, subsidies provided to the fossil fuel
industry in the U.S. and throughout the world are enormous.377
In fact, the International Monetary Fund estimates that
subsidies provided to the fossil fuel industry constitute 85% of
all subsidies provided globally.378
For many years now, the enormous subsidies that various
U.S. government entities have provided to the U.S. fossil fuel
industry have caused all kinds of distortions in the energy
marketplace and other harmful results.379 In particular,
373. See id. See generally GENE M. GROSSMAN, PROMOTING NEW
INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITIES: A SURVEY OF RECENT ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE
(1989) (discussing a wide range of market failures that could justify provision
of a government subsidy to a particular company or industry).
374. See Aldy, supra note 355, at 1, 7 (stating that “fossil fuel production
subsidies do not correct market failures” and explaining that, to the contrary,
such subsidies constitute “a government failure”).
375. E.g., Fact Sheet, supra note 37, at 1.
376. See Johannes Urpelainen & Elisha George, Reforming Global Fossil
Fuel Subsidies: How the United States Can Restart International Cooperation,
BROOKINGS INST. (July 14, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/research/reformi
ng-global-fossil-fuel-subsidies-how-the-united-states-can-restart-internationalcooperation/ (“[S]caling up domestic fossil fuel production was part of the United
States’ aggressive push for energy security following the OPEC oil embargo in
1973.”); OECD, FOSSIL FUEL SUPPORT COUNTRY NOTE: UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (June 2020), http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/fileview2.aspx?IDFile=2c7b60
cf-dae4-49dd-ac64-b173bd0a403e (“Exports of crude oil . . . were previously
banned until the 40-year-old policy was repealed at the end of 2015.”).
377. See Fact Sheet, supra note 37, at 2.
378. Id.
379. See id. at 1–2; Urpelainen & George, supra note 376; Hans Biebl,
Comment, Energy Subsidies, Market Distortion, and a Free Market Alternative,
46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM CAVEAT 43, 43–44 (2012) (“‘[M]arket distortions
created by fossil fuel subsidies’ have led to inefficient market share ‘allocation
within the energy sector.’” (quoting OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR
2013, CUTS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND SAVINGS, BUDGET OF THE U.S.
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hundreds, if not thousands, of new companies have entered the
oil and gas markets in recent years, when neither the U.S. nor
the world in general needs any more oil or gas.380 These
companies have helped to further pollute the air in local
communities and contribute to global warming through the
burning of their oil and gas.381 In addition, some studies have
concluded that approximately one-half of the companies in the
U.S. fossil fuel industry would be unprofitable in the absence of
the pre-tax subsidies that the federal and state governments are
providing to them.382 Furthermore, the subsidies provided to
these companies have made it much more difficult for those
same government entities to subsidize the development of
alternative energy sources.383

GOVERNMENT 80 (2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/bu
dget/fy2013/assets/ccs.pdf)).
380. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 313 (“[I]t makes literally no sense for
the industry to go hunting for more fossil fuel . . . We’ve binged to the edge of
our own destruction.”).
381. See, e.g., id.; David Roberts, Friendly Policies Keep US Oil and Coal
Afloat Far More Than We Thought, VOX (July 26, 2018), https://www.vox
.com/energy-and-environment/2017/10/6/16428458/us-energy-coal-oil-subsidies
(“‘[T]ax preferences and other subsidies push nearly half of new, yet-to-bedeveloped oil into profitability. This potentially increases US oil production by
almost 17 billion barrels over the next few decades, equivalent to 6 billion
tonnes (Gt) of CO2.’ Almost half of the new oil fields getting drilled would have
been left alone if not for subsidies.” (quoting Peter Erickson et al., Effect of
Subsidies to Fossil Fuel Companies on United States Crude Oil Production, 2
NATURE ENERGY 891 (2017))).
382. See Bart Hawkins Kreps, Pulling the Plug on Fossil Fuel Production
Subsidies, RESILIENCE (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.resilience.org/stories/201903-25/pulling-the-plug-on-fossil-fuel-production-subsidies/ (quoting Erickson et
al., supra note 381). Another study identified which specific oil, gas, and coal
reserves around the world are already borderline unprofitable even with the
enormous subsidies that their owners receive. McGlade & Ekins, supra note
313, at 188–90; see also Carrington, supra note 313 (discussing the McGlade
and Ekins study).
383. George Ferns & Marcus Gomes, G7: Why Major Economies Are
Delaying a Break with the Fossil Fuel Industry, CONVERSATION (June 10, 2021),
https://theconversation.com/g7-why-major-economies-are-delaying-a-breakwith-the-fossil-fuel-industry-162281 (“Governmental support for the industry
in the form of subsidies or tax breaks artificially inflates the profitability of
fossil fuels, in turn making renewables a less attractive investment.”);
OCEANA, FACT SHEET: MYTH VS. FACT – OIL & GAS SUBSIDIES 1 (Apr. 5, 2012),
https://usa.oceana.org/sites/default/files/MythsFactsheet_JustSubsidies_FINA
L_4-5-12.pdf (“[T]he U.S. Government – by eliminating unnecessary subsidies
for oil and gas – would be saving on the order of $10 billion per year that could
be invested in other national priorities like defense, transportation, or
alternative energy. A Congressional Research Service report corroborates these
findings.” (footnotes omitted)).
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Perhaps best illustrating the perverse nature of the
subsidies that the federal and state governments provide to the
fossil fuel industry is the fact that these subsidies make the
industry as a whole so wealthy that it then can continue to
pressure lawmakers into continuing to grant the industry
subsidies year after year.384 Lobbying and campaign
contribution costs are a matter of public record.385 For decades,
fossil fuel companies have paid hundreds of millions of dollars in
lobbying and campaign contribution costs annually to block the
U.S. Congress’ enactment of any legislation adverse to their
interests.386 For example, as Figure 9 reveals, in 2018 and 2020
(campaign years), lobbying costs and campaign contributions by
the energy/natural resources sector as a whole totaled
$250,837,518 in 2018 and $297,803,541 in 2020, with a large
majority of those totals coming from oil and gas, natural gas, and
coal mining, combined.387

384. See infra text accompanying notes 385–80; infra Figure 9.
385. See generally Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601–14;
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–146.
386. See infra text accompanying note 388.
387. See id.
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2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
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CONTRIBUTIONS
232,475,652
187,126,813*
280,342,904
170,395,925*
251,600,967
154,469,532*
266,983,293
147,789,920*
250,837,518
149,312,359*
297,803,541

FIGURE 9: LOBBYING/CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS PAID
BY THE ENERGY/NATURAL RESOURCES SECTOR,
INCLUDING FOSSIL FUEL INDUSTRIES388 (U.S. $
MILLIONS)
*No campaign contributions are recorded for these years, as they
are non-campaign years.

As Joseph Aldy stated in his article “Eliminating Fossil Fuel
Subsidies,” fossil fuel subsidies “convey billions of dollars of
benefits to the firms claiming them without an identifiable
benefit for consumers or for the nation’s energy security.”389 The
enormity of the pre-tax and post-tax subsidies provided to the
U.S. fossil fuel industry is demonstrated by the fact that it “is
more than the country’s defense budget and 10 times the federal

388. Energy/Natural Resources: Long-Term Contribution Trends,
OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=2022
&ind=E (last visited Oct. 31, 2021). Considering only campaign contributions, a
large majority of campaign contributions by the energy/natural resources sector
comes from fossil fuel industries (e.g., oil and gas, natural gas, and coal mining).
For example, for 2020 contributions: oil and gas, natural gas, and coal mining
combined for a total contribution of approximately $168.2 million of the sector
total of $221.1 million. See id. Similarly, for 2018 contributions: oil and gas,
natural gas, and coal mining combined for a total contribution of approximately
$101.2 million of the sector total of $145.2 million. See id. To see the
contribution amount for individual industries within the energy/natural
resources sector, choose the specific industry (e.g., “Oil & Gas”) from the
“Industries in this Sector:” drop-down list.
389. Joseph E. Aldy, Proposal 5: Eliminating Fossil Fuel Subsidies, in THE
HAMILTON PROJECT: 15 WAYS TO RETHINK THE FEDERAL BUDGET 31, 32
(Michael Greenstone et al. eds., 2013), https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets
/files/fifteen_ways_to_rethink_the_federal_budget_full_book.pdf.
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spending for education.”390 And the utter absurdity of the U.S.’
and other countries’ phenomenal subsidization of the fossil fuel
industry was succinctly summarized in May 2019 by the U.N.
Secretary-General, António Guterres: “What we are doing is
using taxpayers’ money – which means our money – to boost
hurricanes, to spread droughts, to melt glaciers, to bleach corals.
In one [phrase]: to destroy the world.”391
For all the above reasons, many economists and
environmentalists are steadfastly opposed to the provision of
subsidies to the fossil fuel industry. Accordingly, in 2009, former
U.S. President Obama, at a meeting of the G20 nations, proposed
that the G20 nations end inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.392 Then,
in 2012, President Obama particularly urged the end of
subsidies to the oil and gas industries, stating that “[y]ou can
keep subsidizing a fossil fuel that’s been getting taxpayer dollars
for a century, or you can place your bets on a clean-energy
future.”393 To date, though, very little progress has been made
toward fulfilling the goal of ending fossil fuel subsidies.394
However, at the 2016 G7 meeting, the leaders of the G7 nations
urged “all countries to eliminate inefficient subsidies by no later
than 2025 and left the door open to an earlier phase-out for some
countries.”395

390. James Ellsmoor, United States Spend Ten Times More on Fossil Fuel
Subsidies Than Education, FORBES (June 15, 2019), https://www.forbes.com
/sites/jamesellsmoor/2019/06/15/united-states-spend-ten-times-more-on-fossilfuel-subsidies-than-education/?sh=7ca4c64a4473.
391. Damian Carrington, Just 10% of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Cash ‘Could Pay
for Green Transition’, GUARDIAN (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com
/environment/2019/aug/01/fossil-fuel-subsidy-cash-pay-green-energytransition.
392. Fossil Fuel Subsidies Overview, OIL CHANGE INT’L, http://priceofoil.org
/fossil-fuel-subsidies/#:~:text=What%20Is%20a%20Fossil%20Fuel,price%20pai
d%20by%20energy%20consumers (last visited Oct. 31, 2021) (“In 2009, the
Obama Administration and the G20 nations proposed that they end
“inefficient” fossil fuel subsidies.”).
393. Helene Cooper & Jonathan Weisman, Obama Seeks to End Subsidies
for Oil and Gas Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2012), https://www.nytimes
.com/2012/03/02/us/politics/obama-calls-for-an-end-to-subsidies-for-oil-and-gascompanies.html.
394. See OIL CHANGE INT’L, supra note 392 (noting that although the Obama
Administration and G20 proposal generated repeated acknowledgement, “it
resulted in very limited progress for many years . . . . You can’t really say you’re
committed to the fight against climate change if you’re still funding oil, gas, and
coal”).
395. Id.
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To repeat, the subsidies that various U.S. government
entities are providing to the fossil fuel industry are causing
terrific economic and environmental harm,396 and the U.S. has
indicated that it will eliminate these subsidies by 2025.397
Consequently, as stated above, if the current U.S. Congress and
other government entities enact any legislation opposed by the
fossil fuel industry in the next few years, it most likely will be to
abolish or phase out the approximately $118.1 billion in pre-tax
subsidies that they are currently providing to the fossil fuel
industry.398
Again, the important point of this section of the paper is that
even if the U.S. federal and state governments cannot force the
U.S. fossil fuel industry to internalize the negative externalities
that the industry imposes on society (as appears to be the case),
the analysis presented above demonstrates that it would, in fact,
be economically efficient for the U.S. Government to pay
producers and refiners not to extract, refine, sell, or distribute
their fossil fuels, through the provision of income tax benefits.
This is the case even if the U.S. Government had to pay these
owners the full value of their businesses, as the costs of local air
pollution and global warming imposed on society each year by
the burning of fossil fuels is much higher than their annual
profits.
C. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CAN AFFORD TO PAY PRODUCERS
AND REFINERS NOT TO EXTRACT AND REFINE THEIR FOSSIL
FUELS.
As stated above, the highest estimate of the value of the
entire U.S. fossil fuel industry today is $858.4 billion, or $1
trillion when rounded up.399 Furthermore, as discussed above,
pre-tax subsidies provided to the U.S. fossil fuel industry in 2017
totaled approximately $118.1 billion,400 and most of these pretax subsidies were provided by the federal government.401 If the
U.S. Government were to redirect the $118.1 billion per year in
pre-tax subsidies it pays to the U.S. fossil fuel industry to the
new conservation easement program, it would take the U.S.
396. See, e.g., Le et al., supra note 46 (enter “U.S.” and year desired); Coady
et al., supra note 44, passim.
397. OIL CHANGE INT’L, supra note 392.
398. See supra text accompanying notes 366–69.
399. Supra note 337 and accompanying text.
400. See supra text accompanying notes 357–66; supra Fig. 8.
401. Supra note 366 and accompanying text.
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Government approximately 8.5 years to pay the $1 trillion
figure.402
As discussed above, I recommend that the IRC be amended
to provide that an owner of fossil fuels can take a credit (rather
than a deduction) for the value of a conservation easement
prohibiting extraction or refinement of those fuels.403 If the U.S.
Government wishes to spread such payments over several years,
it could limit the amount a taxpayer can claim for the credit each
year and then permit the taxpayer to carry-over any unclaimed
value for a specified number of years in the future. There should
not be any resistance to adoption of such an annual claim limit
and carry-over provision, especially as a carry-over period of
fifteen years is already in place for other types of conservation
easements.404 It is axiomatic that a fossil fuel owner could not
receive payment for foregoing extraction or refinement of the
owner’s fossil fuels pursuant to a conservation easement and at
the same time receive subsidies based on the extraction or
refinement of those fossil fuels. Still, as stated above, the IRC
could also be explicitly amended to condition the U.S.
Government’s payment for a conservation easement granted by
a producer or refiner on the cessation of any further government
subsidies to that producer or refiner.
For some period of time after the U.S. Government has
commenced a conservation easement program, the U.S. federal
and state governments could continue to pay consumer subsidies
to consumers and producer subsidies to fossil fuel producers and
refiners that are not participating in the conservation easement
program. However, as the value of fossil fuel deposits decrease
in the future405 and conservation easement program becomes
more popular, it should become easier and easier for the federal
and state governments to abolish all producer and consumer
subsidies. In short, the U.S. Government can afford to pay
producers and refiners not to extract, refine, sell, or distribute

402. One trillion U.S. dollars divided by $118.1 billion is 8.467.
403. See supra text accompanying notes 232–46.
404. See supra text accompanying notes 73–87; see 26 U.S.C. §
170(b)(1)(E)(ii).
405. See Carrington, supra note 313 (“Major fossil fuel companies face the
risk that significant parts of their reserves will become worthless.”); Adam
Barth et al., The Future of Natural Gas in North America, MCKINSEY & CO.
(Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/electric-power-andnatural-gas/our-insights/the-future-of-natural-gas-in-north-america# (stating
that decarbonization policies and shifting demand for renewable energy are
likely to reduce the revenues and profits of natural gas producers).
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their fossil fuels. As most pre-tax fossil fuel subsidies are
provided by the U.S. Government,406 the U.S. Government
ultimately should be able to pay for the conservation easements
proposed in this paper by redirecting the pre-tax subsidies that
it currently provides to the fossil fuel industry to the new
conservation easement program.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Despite all the international efforts to slow global warming
in the last few decades, the last seven years have been the seven
hottest years on record, with “2020 tied with 2016 as the
warmest year on record, according to an analysis by NASA.”407
Clearly, we need to take very bold actions now to reverse the
perverse death spiral that humankind currently is engaged in
with the fossil fuel industry. Furthermore, as Garrett Hardin
has advised, we must rely on private market measures to reduce
CO2 emissions and slow global warming, as there does not seem
to be any way to force independent nations or individual
companies within the U.S. to stop extracting, refining, selling, or
distributing fossil fuels.408
The specific action considered here—private conservation
easements prohibiting the extraction, refinement, sale, and
distribution of fossil fuels—certainly is novel and may be
distasteful to many. To begin with, the idea that it would ever
make sense to pay someone to do nothing is difficult to grasp.409
However, there is precedent for such payments. For example, in
the U.S. and around the world, workers have received incentives
not to commute to work during certain hours of the workday,410
and the U.S. Government pays farmers not to grow certain crops
in certain years.411
Moreover, the terrific public largesse that the fossil fuel
industry has already enjoyed over the years makes it especially
406. Supra note 366 and accompanying text.
407. 2020 Tied for Warmest Year on Record, supra note 52.
408. See Hardin, supra note 101, at 1245–47.
409. See Stover, supra note 21 (quoting German Minister of Economic
Cooperation and Development Dirk Niebel noting, in response to former
Ecuadorian President Correa’s Yasuní proposal, that “countries such as
Germany did not like the idea of ‘payment for non-action’”).
410. Richard Mudge, They Pay Famers Not to Grow Crops, Don’t They?, ENO
CTR. FOR TRANSP. (Sept. 16, 2013), https://www.enotrans.org/article/payfarmers-not-grow-crops-dont/.
411. Id.; see also Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936, 16
U.S.C. §§ 590a–q; Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C. § 1281–393.
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difficult to accept that the most economically efficient method of
slowing global warming may be to pay fossil fuel owners again,
this time not to exploit their fossil fuels. Arguably, the U.S. fossil
fuel industry has acted like a bully for decades,412 but any
realistic effort to slow global warming must acknowledge, rather
than simply bemoan, the fact that the fossil fuel industry today
possesses tremendous political power and may continue to do so
for the near future. Furthermore, this article considers the
global warming crisis from the perspective of the economic
theory of property rights, which treats an economically efficient
outcome as a just outcome, and the analysis presented here
strongly suggests that paying fossil fuel owners to close their
operations and leave their fossil fuels in the ground is an
economically efficient method of slowing global warming.
Fossil fuel companies have already located approximately
five times more fossil fuel reserves than can be burned and still
limit warming to 1.5° Celsius,413 so that continuing to explore for
more fossil fuels literally is a waste of energy, in addition to a
waste of time and money.414 Scientists have concluded that wind
and solar energy alone could provide approximately 80% of the
U.S.’ energy needs,415 and the U.S. possesses a very large reserve
of oil, referred to as the “strategic petroleum reserve,” as well as
large reserves of gasoline, from which it can make withdrawals
whenever needed.416 Finally, in order to pay for a new
412. E.g., Emma Searson, No More Candy for Fossil Fuels, ENV’T AM. (Aug.
4, 2020), https://environmentamerica.org/blogs/environment-america-blog/ame
/no-more-candy-fossil-fuels (discussing how the U.S. fossil fuel industry has
received billions of dollars of COVID-19 recovery funds, despite receiving
billions of dollars in subsidies from the federal and state governments each year,
describing the fossil fuel industry as “the big bad bully”).
413. Jack Shapiro, 8 Reasons Why We Need to Phase Out the Fossil Fuel
Industry, GREENPEACE (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/8reasons-why-we-need-to-phase-out-the-fossil-fuel-industry/ (discussing an
IPCC special report). See generally Allen et al, supra note 222.
414. See Carrington, supra note 313.
415. See Matthew R. Shaner et al., Geophysical Constraints on the
Reliability of Solar and Wind Power in the United States, 11 ENERGY & ENV’T
SCI. 914 (2018); see also Ellsmoor, supra note 390 (discussing the study
published in Energy & Environmental Science).
416. See Grant Nülle, New Legislation Affects U.S. Strategic Petroleum
Reserve, EIA (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=
24072 (“As the largest stockpile of government-owned emergency crude oil in
the world, the SPR is designed to help alleviate significant disruptions in oil
supplies from events such as severe weather; major geopolitical events; and
unplanned production, transport, and delivery outages. Located in four storage
sites along the Gulf of Mexico, the SPR currently holds more than 695 million
barrels of crude oil, or about 96% of its 727 million barrel design capacity . . . .
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conservation easement program through which fossil fuel
owners agree not to further extract, refine, sell, or distribute
fossil fuels, the U.S. Government can simply redirect the very
large subsidies that it already pays to the U.S. fossil fuel
industry to the new conservation easement program.
Essentially, the conservation easement program proposed
here accepts the great political power that the fossil fuel
industry currently possesses and suggests a method of
accomplishing what society otherwise cannot seem to
accomplish: outlawing further extraction or trafficking in fossil
fuels and at the same time providing a way for the fossil fuel
companies to go out of business. Owners of fossil fuels would
expect to be compensated for leaving their fossil fuels in the
ground, just as developing countries like Ecuador expect to be
paid for leaving their fossil fuels in the ground.417 At the very
least, it is hoped that this paper has sparked further interest in
novel private market measures that could help combat climate
change.

[O]ne million barrels of gasoline are held in the Northeast Gasoline Supply
Reserve.”); Chris Baraniuk, Why the US Hides 700 Million Barrels of Oil
Underground, BBC (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/future/article
/20150921-why-the-us-hides-700-million-barrels-of-oil-underground
(“The
[SPR]’s formidable size makes it a significant deterrent to oil import cutoffs and
a key tool of foreign policy.”); HEATHER L. GREENLEY, CONG. RESEARCH
SERVICE, THE STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE: BACKGROUND, AUTHORITIES,
AND CONSIDERATIONS at Summary, 2 (May 13, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs
/misc/R46355.pdf (explaining that the U.S. Congress created the SPR in
response to the 1973 to 1974 oil embargo imposed by the Organization of Arab
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and the consequent tripling in the
price of imported crude oil but noting that the SPR’s security role may be
diminished now that the U.S. is a net exporter of crude oil and petroleum
products).
417. See Kestenbaum, supra note 1 (quoting Former Ecuadorian President
Rafael Correa’s discussion regarding the need to exploit the Yasuní oil fields to
help the poor of Ecuador since the international community would not pay
Ecuador not to drill in the Yasuní); Harstad, Financial Times, supra note 248
(“[Fossil fuel] owners will certainly request compensation for conserving their
resources on the world’s behalf.”); Carrington, supra note 313 (stating that
providing compensation would be key to getting countries (whether rich or poor)
to agree to keep their fossil fuels in the ground).
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